Here is a comment from Nezygar, which many (e.g. Latynina) believe to be a Kremlin project. Still, that makes it interesting, if you keep this in mind:

Russia already had a serious experience of participating in the settlement of political crises in the post-Soviet space,

but not the most successful one. In Georgia, Moscow played an important role in persuading Eduard Shevardnadze to step down as president. In 2003, Igor Ivanov's mediation mission was designed to ensure a quiet transfer of power to the new leader, and Moscow hoped that Georgia

would remain "pro-Russian" in any case. However, the tactically successful mission turned into a strategic failure - Russia very quickly fell out with Saakashvili, who won the elections.

From a relatively recent experience, February 2014. Moscow sends Vladimir Lukin to Kiev with an intermediary mission. But Lukin failed to keep the initiative in the negotiation process - the West was much more active and, frankly, more attractive as an arbiter.

With Belarus, everything is also complicated. On the one hand, the possibilities of the West are more limited here, Lukashenko is unlikely to discuss the terms of his surrender with “enemies”. His only guarantor is Moscow. Plus, there are no anti-Russian sentiments

(although the pro-Russian ones are apparently not so unconditional to bet on the Belarusian society as an ally). But Moscow can again count on becoming the main guarantor of a peaceful change of power.

May well send a respectable mediator, with an integration plan, of course. But the problem is that the Belarusian society will no longer accept the puppet, and any legitimate and strong winner will inevitably turn his head to the West.

Right now, the Kremlin is building its entire line on pressure on Lukashenko and many in Moscow think that the people will not go anywhere, they are their own. But as soon as Lukashenka leaves, Moscow will have to deal with a society that will no longer be what it was before.

The main question is how really strong is the social base of the Kremlin project in Belarus? And how far Moscow is ready to go to advance it?