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1/ I think there may be something to learn by comparing @realDonaldTrump's current threat to attempt "snapback" under #JCPOA and UNSCR 2231 with his decision not to do so in May 2018, when he withdrew from the deal but did not snapback all previous UN sanctions.
A long thread.
A long thread.
2/ In 2018, the US was more clearly in a position to do so. Rather than announcing "withdrawal," Trump could have initiated the dispute resolution mechanism or skipped that step and gone straight to snapback.
3/ There were implementation issues, as @james_acton32 and I addressed at the time: https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/12/trump-administration-and-iran-nuclear-deal-analysis-of-noncompliance-claims-pub-73214. None of these merited snapback, which the EU/E# would have deemed imprudent and perhaps even illegitimate, but it would have been impossible to challenge US standing.
4/ So why didn't they do it? Three reasons, I think:
First, @AmbJohnBolton's ideological commitment to unilateralism, which made him loath to play by multilateral rules, even when it was to his advantage.
First, @AmbJohnBolton's ideological commitment to unilateralism, which made him loath to play by multilateral rules, even when it was to his advantage.
5/ Second, an understanding that snapback would be received very badly by our closest European Allies, creating bilateral costs in those relationships that might be problematic for other Trump goals.
6/ Third, confidence--overconfidence, as it happens--that the JCPOA would collapse without US compliance, perhaps with an Iranian over-reaction. In fact, Bolton may have been pleased to imagine Europe forced to witness its own inability to save the deal, even without snapback.
7/ Having decided not to snapback, why did the Administration use language that would prove problematic, like Bolton saying "We are not using the provisions of UNSC 2231 because we are out the of the deal," or many officials insisting that the US was not longer a "participant"?
8/ I suspect two reasons:
First, the Trump Administration has never had a national security process and may simply not have known the implications of their rhetorical choices.
First, the Trump Administration has never had a national security process and may simply not have known the implications of their rhetorical choices.
9/ Second, Bolton and @mikepompeo were probably trying to protect their right flanks. Pompeo in particular must know that there is only room for one Pretender in the bizarre Trumpist-Neocon camp and needed a good answer for Cruz, Cotton, et al on snapback.
10/ What better than to say "we cannot snapback, because we are doing an even more hawkish thing!"
11/ Why have they changed their minds? Let's start with what does not explain it -- a worry about the arms embargo or Iranian arms commerce. If you wanted to limit arms commerce with Iran, the last thing you'd do is waste leverage on this fool's errand: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/05/07/can-pompeo-trap-a-future-president-biden-in-trumps-self-imposed-iran-crisis/
12/ Pompeo's original motivation was probably to try to shatter the remnants of the JCPOA by provoking Iran or braking the legal framework so that a potential President @JoeBiden could not meet his intention of "returning to mutual compliance."
13/ But the humiliating defeat of the US arms embargo extension surely makes clear that the world is more likely to ignore Trump's next tantrum than overreact to it or be bound by it if he loses.
14/ The costs of this snapback play are higher than they would have been in 2018, but borne by different payers. In 2018, it would have done damage to bilateral relations Trump and Pompeo needed for other objectives.
15/ Now, the cost will be a devastating loss of UNSC authority that will damage the US role in the world for the foreseeable future -- but the Trump Administration manifestly is not too worried about damage done to the country rather than to its own ambition.
16/ Still, why pay the price? Maybe there is some sense that it puts Biden in an uncomfortable position of appearing to defend the end of the embargo when he defends the JCPOA, but even JCPOA opponents in the democratic caucus can manage the distinction: https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2020/5/overwhelming-bipartisan-majority-of-house-members-calls-on-administration-to-extend-iran-arms-embargo
17/ It probably has more to do Pompeo's 2024 ambitions. Certainly, the polemicists of this move are writing to burnish their credentials among an audience of hawks and not for the Europeans they pretend to want to influence: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/15/dont-let-iran-blow-up-the-u-n-security-council/
18/ This makes sense as part of the hawks "hedging against a Biden win" ( https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/06/trumps-foreign-policy-team-is-hedging-against-biden-win/) but more broadly as Pompeo preparing for a 2024 primary where Trump will not be in a position to play kingmaker.
19/ Where does this leave us? With little hope for moderation or reconsideration in the short term. Something that Pompeo thinks is good for his future and Trump thinks speaks ill of @BarackObama will be hard to stop if the costs are merely to US national security interests.
20/ But the comparison does help clarify the choices that other countries and potentially a President Biden will need to make.
