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We should not be negotiating Belarus’s future with Moscow or anyone else. Belarusians will choose their path, just as Armenians did theirs. But @carlbildt is right that any new gov’t in Minsk will need global integration more than a break with Russia. /1 https://twitter.com/carlbildt/status/1294561974026678272
He is also right in his implication that Moscow’s non-interference in Armenia was predicated on Pashinyan not pursuing EU integration or withdrawing from the Eurasian Union. (In both cases, NATO is irrelevant.) /2
Tikhanovskaya and the broader opposition have studiously hemmed to a similar line, which is one of the reasons Moscow is content to take a wait-and-see position. /3
But that’s not the only factor. Through key ownership stakes, Russia has much greater structural leverage over Minsk than over Kyiv, and that will remain even when Lukashenko is gone. /4
If Europe wants to help Belarus move towards better governance, then, it will need to play a smarter and longer game. It cannot insist on leaving the customs union with Russia or on undoing Russia’s shareholdings in key sectors. /5
What Europe can do is begin to reshape the economic incentive structure, by supporting FDI into Belarus, investing in infrastructure links, facilitating visas and - most importantly - opening itself up to imports from sectors not dominated by Russia. Especially agriculture. /6
By creating incentives - real market forces, not rhetoric or symbolic facilitation - for the growth of private enterprise in Europe-oriented sectors, the EU can help shift the economic balance of power. /7
The EU can also make it clear that it will not allow those who have profiteered from Lukashenko’s rule - or who will attempt to make windfalls after his departure - to launder their gains and reputations in Europe. /8
Brussels and member states can help a new gov’t in Minsk track down and repatriate stolen assets. (And then they can help Kyiv do the same.) /9
Moscow will try to protect its interests, of course, but it will mostly play along - because it doesn’t have a choice. Putin can’t control the Belarusian street any more than Lukashenko can. And it can’t afford a war it doesn’t absolutely need to fight. /10
But nothing can be accomplished by returning to the old formats. Talking shops do more harm than good: they create public expectations of integrations that even well-meaning leaders fail to deliver, engendering only mistrust and acrimony. /11
As long as the EU pursued policies - such as the Eastern Partnerhip - that are designed to substitute for real integration (and thus sooth skittish political nerves in the west), it will lose out to a Kremlin that is willing to invest real capital for real gains. /12
The EU doesn’t have to - and shouldn’t - dangle a membership perspective. (That perspective exists anyway.) /13
But enlightened leaders like @carlbildt _can_ turn their efforts to lobbying their EU colleagues to drop barriers to imports, ease travel restrictions, and reject stolen assets. /14
In short, it’s time to stop asking what Belarus or Russia are prepared to do. The real question is: What is Europe prepared to do? What will Europe sacrifice for the welfare of people willing to fight for democracy? How much does Europe really care? /END
PS: It pains me to no end that there is absolutely no point in even beginning to imagine a US role in this situation.
