Been focusing and struggling to finish a chapter on East European diasporas and borders, but in the last few days there has been a lot of commentary over the supposed role of Turkish diaspora voters in shaping German state strategy, so a few points of needed clarification >

1. In the CDU-CSU/SPD governing coalition, Kanzleramt under a CDU Chancellor calls the final shots over German European and security strategy. The CDU/CSU has long struggled to attract Turkish diaspora voters, who are not a demographic with decisive influence on CDU thinking

2. The SPD draws substantial Turkish diaspora voters, but these are broken up into milieus that are more supportive of Erdogan and the AKP regime as well as Turkish and Kurdish diasporas that are fiercely opposed to the current Turkish government. No cohesive diaspora pressure

3. As a potential future coalition partner next year or after elections, the Green Party also draws substantial numbers of Turkish diaspora voters. But these are primarily from Turkish diaspora milieus ferociously opposed to Erdogan and the AKP.

4. While Turkish diaspora milieus ferociously opposed to the AKP might share its view of Turkish sea borders in the East Med, they are not necessarily inclined to lobby in favour of the risky confrontational approach taken by the AKP government.

5. Substantial parts of the Turkish diaspora supportive of the AKP government and the Erdogan personality cult that uses military adventurism to sustain public support do not necessarily vote in German elections, but rather are more likely to use their vote in Turkish elections

6. While a Kurdish diaspora mostly hostile to the Turkish state operates as a highly effective unified block in shaping German party political debate, internal rivalry and disunity of the Turkish diaspora blunts the ability of its organisations to shape German policy

7. When it comes to the East Med, any discussion of Turkish diaspora voters and their impact needs to also take the role of a substantial Greek diaspora and its voters in Germany into account. In cities like Bochum, German politicians know not to mess with Greek organisations

8. Rather than hyping divided Turkish diaspora, in analysing German responses to East Med crisis look at its entrenched diplomatic traditions in response to crisis. Frustration experienced by Cypriots and Greeks is similar to that of Ukrainians and East European EU states in 2014

9. German diplomats and leaders are shaped by a political environment that emphasises seeking every possible opportunity for dialogue before shifting to confrontation. It's a deeply entrenched approach that drives EU partners nuts but is essential to building consensus in Germany

10. Emphasis on dialogue slows down German responses in escalation situations, but is crucial to sustaining consensus for confrontation if a state that is pushing against the EU system burns down all off ramps that Berlin offers it.

11. If the AKP leadership follows the advice of wiser voices in Ankara, the Turkish state needs to pull back a little to keep Berlin's focus on dialogue going. If Ankara burns one off-ramp too many, even Berlin will feel impelled by the dynamics of the EU system to back Greece

12. Beyond the tortuous process of strategic consensus-building in Berlin, not enough attention has been paid to the responses and interests of Italy, the other central (if not more central) EU player when it comes to EU policy-making and security in the Med

13. In riding roughshod over Italian interests in Libya, and backing escalation in Libya crisis in April 2019 that undermined Italian interests and opened up a huge opportunity for Turkey, France needs to take its share of the blame for EU's problems in the East Med

14. France's blunders are not Greece's fault, but in understandably falling back on French support, Greek policy-makers need to keep in mind that for any effective EU response in the East Med, they need Italy and its navy on board too. That means acknowledging Rome's interests

15. So coming back to the problems with analysis of the role of the Turkish diaspora in German policy-making, these are twofold. It misunderstands the role of the Turkish diaspora in German politics and it misunderstands the role of Germany and other actors in shaping EU strategy

Final point, hammering away at supposed "German cowardice" did not help Ukraine or EU East European states much in the spring of 2014. Smart actors in Kyiv in Warsaw knew that. Greek state actors have wisely avoided the language of punditry. French state actors need to as well.