Recall the Feb 2018 Russian veto of resolution on Iranian violation of arms embargo in Yemen was described as the “1st Russian veto of an anti-Iranian resolution since the hostage crisis” in Iran (as in last veto was the soviets in the Jan 1980)

This I believe was indicative of an improvement in the Russia-Iran bilateral relationship and perhaps even foreshadowed the Russian veto today.

Russia-Iran relations are not strategic but the shift in Moscow’s willingness to contest US policy towards Iran has grown...

...It is not only because of Ukraine and the support is mutual. You can look at Iran’s voting in the UNGA on issues Russia cares about since 2018. I’m writing something on this rn and happy to share my findings on this to anyone interested.

An additional thing to note is that China has typically been far more reluctant to wield its veto power in the UNSC than Russia.

I cede the analysis of Iran-China to experts like @jacoposcita but this vote was important for Iran’s relationship with both countries.

Both Russia and China put in considerable effort to discredit the legal basis of the US resolution including digging up a 1971 ICJ legal opinion (see the RU/China letters to the UNSG in late May)

I’m not going to go into Russia’s many violations of international law in Ukraine and Georgia but generally Moscow likes to distinguish the arbitrary US-led “rules based order” from a more constrained, state centric interpretation of international law

Anyway, this was significant for the Russia-Iran relationship *not bcuz of arms* and very much related to Russia’s broader view of international law outside its so-called sphere of special responsibility or whatever you want to call it

Sorry for typos and tangents