The #Belarus opposition may or may not have won today’s election. But in a system that is not designed to produce an honest result and an accurate count, does that really matter? /1 https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1292566240465235969

Lukashenko’s regime did the only thing it could do in these elections: claim an overwhelming victory. After 26 years in power, his ability to rule rests fundamentally on the absence of a visibly viable alternative. A narrow victory - or a runoff - would puncture that illusion. /2

The regime was never going to announce any result less resounding than this one. The actual vote count is, for the system, entirely extraneous information. There may, in fact, be no one who knows the real result. /3

The people on the streets of Minsk and other cities don’t know whether they really won. Neither do the riot police who came out to suppress them. Neither does Lukashenko. And it doesn’t matter. /4

In an autocracy - even one that holds elections - to ask who got the most votes is to ask the wrong question. The real question is whether the street, the police and the elite believe that the autocrat has the raw power to rule. Once that belief is gone, the leader is toast. /5

The patently ridiculous official election result was only half of today’s inevitable outcome. The other half is the gov’t show of force on the streets. Both are designed to demonstrate the regime’s remaining mojo: “we can lie to you, and we can force you to deal with it.” /6

Bear that all in mind when trying to decide who’s right and who’s wrong in Belarus tonight. /7

A leadership that falsifies an election, that shuts down the internet and beats up journalists, and that meets protesters with force loses the right to ask the opposition to respect “the will of the people.” /8

Western governments - preoccupied, brow-beaten and disunited as they are - are eerily silent. They cast wary eyes towards Moscow and Kyiv and want no part; they may also look inward and wonder, rightly, where they get off criticizing Minsk’s use of force. /9

I’m not here to argue for an interventionist policy in Belarus. But there may come a time - perhaps very soon - when Europe in particular will have to choose between acquiescence to Lulashenko and the aspirations of those who challenge him. /10

Some will call that choice a no-brainer: how could we stand with the “last dictator in Europe”? Others will say it’s none of our business, and will remind us of our track record elsewhere with democracy promotion. Both would be wrong. /11

We in the west do not have the luxury of deciding when people in other countries will seek to throw off a dictator. We also don’t have the luxury of thinking that our actions don’t matter. /12

What the “none of our business” camp often fails to note is that non-intervention in the midst of a putative revolution actually amounts to intervention on behalf of the regime. By continuing to recognize the incumbent, we strengthen his hand and weaken is opponents. /13

Western intervention is often accused of leading to violence and chaos, but false neutrality can have the same effect:
It forces the opposition either to acquiesce, or to up the stakes, pushing and pushing until power shifts - rapidly and unpredictably, like a siesmic shock. /14

Europe could play a constructive role in organizing an orderly, negotiated transition. “Could” does not mean “must,” or even “knows how.” And even if it did, it’s still not an easy decision to make. But inaction is also a decision, and we should be clear about that. /15

Whatever you think should be done, though, please remember this: no one is in the streets of Belarus tonight because they wanted to be there. It wasn’t the opposition that elected to decide Belarus’s future in the streets, rather than at the ballot box. The regime did that. /END