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Brace yourselves, folks: I'm about to saying something good about the upcoming ACFT tests in the fall.
Once upon a time, I worked data collection for one of the Force XXI Operational Tests. Specifically, I worked on GCCS-A. Except that there was a problem: it didn't work. And every day we were sent out to collect data and come back and report to my boss at OTC what we all knew.
One day, I was frustrated b/c I felt like collecting data saying the system didn't work was a waste of time (ah, the naïveté of SSG me all those years ago). Al looked at me and said we know it doesn't work but we have to show them that it doesn't.
And we do that by collecting data that shows that it doesn't work. That was my first experience with data collection and negative findings (for the record it's probably the only time negatives findings were actively sought *cough* academia *cough* instead of dismissed.
what does this have to do with the ACFT? Well. There's been a lot of crying and wailing and gnashing of the teeth since the ACFT's disastrous initial communications and subsequent not so great communications efforts. But then COVID hit and what happened?
All the gyms were closed. And one of the key things about the ACFT is that it requires equipment. Despite what some may say, it requires equipment that most folks DO NOT have at their houses (like, for example pull up bars).
For folks like me who are doing alternate cardio events, most folks don't have bikes or rowing machines at their houses. So what happens in less than a month when people start taking the ACFT from scratch without x number of months to train up?
We don't actually know and that's why this next data collection is going to be absolutely critical: these ACFTs are going to tell the Army whether or not this test is sustainable in austere environments when there's no equipment around to train for it.
Matt Clark has a great write up of the problems with the Army's PT program and how it conflicts with tactical effectiveness. https://mwi.usma.edu/army-physical-fitness-problem-part-1-eight-myths-weaken-combat-readiness/
BLUF: when we're at peak tactical proficiency ie just coming out of the field, we're at lower distributions of fitness capabilities. And so these ACFTs in the next few months are going to be critical to inform the Army's decision about the ACFT going forward.
About what's reasonable, about what the impact is on folks when they cannot get to the gym for the specialized equipment they need to specifically train for these events.
Oh, don't @ me with all the hoah's who "found a way" to train at home. Good for them but don't point to the exceptions and expect them to be the rule.
I got lucky that I bought an exercise bike on Craigslist before the pandemic hit - you can't find one now and even if you can, they're expensive as hell.
By making the ACFTs not detrimental to Army careers, at least on paper bc we all know that there will be "informal" consequences especially for officers who fail, they have said we need to gather this data and we need to do so in a way that doesn't hurt the force that we have
So. While I'm probably never going to be a convert to the alleged glory of the ACFT, primarily due to the fact that I'm not convinced its a solution in search of a problem it won't solve (winning wars), these data from these upcoming tests are crucially important.
We're about to find out the answer to the question: What does the army's fitness look like on the ACFT when we've all been stuck in our houses for 4-6 months with no gym access?
A CRITICAL question I think that needs to be asked associated with the ACFT scores is who had access to what equipment at their houses. That information needs to be broken down by rank, age, gender, mos.
