Read on Twitter
1. Least important news: I am back on Twitter, sad for my city Beirut for the horrific blast and for my country Lebanon for the existential crisis it is going through, but also hopeful (but as an analyst, skeptical) that the revolutionary movement will shake things.
2. This is a moment whose importance cannot be understated. If the destruction of a capital after the destruction of an economy does not generate profound political and institutional change, then Lebanon cannot be salvaged.
3. There will be many ideas and proposals in coming days for how this change should occur, what kind of transition we should wish for (early elections or transitional government), but let me focus on a matter that will central to any potential progress: Hezbollah.
4. The slogan chanted on the streets of Beirut is: #كلن_يعني_كلن or "All means all." It is a sweeping indictment of a political clique that has run the country for 30 years. By 'run', I mean pilfered, humiliated, manipulated etc. This is a slogan I fully adhere to.
5. Every senior politician (and many of the more junior ones) is responsible for the dire state of affairs and all should be ostracized. This includes Hariri, Jumblatt, Geagea as well as Aoun/Bassil, Berri and Nasrallah. (My own list is much longer).
6. That said, saying " #كلن_يعني_كلن" does not and should create false equivalences -- and here comes Hezbollah.
There is a tendency to treat Hezbollah as one among many, thereby diminishing or at times even dismissing its unique responsibility. Not so.
There is a tendency to treat Hezbollah as one among many, thereby diminishing or at times even dismissing its unique responsibility. Not so.
7. Hezbollah has a unique responsibility in where Lebanon finds itself, and deferring addressing its armed status is not only morally and strategically wrong, it also guarantees that real political transformation will never happen.
8. So why is Hezbollah unique? It starts its own wars; kills, coerces and bullies its domestic rivals; builds its own domestic security infrastructure; has its own economic networks; alienates key international partners etc.
Who else does that?
Who else does that?
***Hezbollah is unique because it sits (like everyone else) within and (like no one else) above the (quasi non-)state that is Lebanon.*** It is an actor with regional ambitions, whose might and resources come from outside.
Who else is that, does that?
Who else is that, does that?
8bis. It has hijacked the Lebanese political process numerous times. Do you remember 2007-08? Or the blockage 2014-16 over the presidency or the legislative elections? For all their many warts, when did Geagea or Hariri do so?
9. Should we count the direct and indirect human, political and economic impact of Hezbollah's adventures? The 2006 war, its contribution to the Syrian tragedy, its role in deterring foreign investment, its control of port/airport/border, its non-payment of taxes, sanctions etc
10. Any analysis on Lebanon that does not put this reality at its center is at best off, likely bad and at worst apologia for Hezbollah.
And there is too much of it, including from people who should know better: https://twitter.com/Rob_Malley/status/1292258807578583040?s=20
And there is too much of it, including from people who should know better: https://twitter.com/Rob_Malley/status/1292258807578583040?s=20
11. Geagea, Jumblatt and Hariri are bad, but last I looked, they have not killed their rivals since the end of the war.
And yes, it would have been much better if ALL had been jailed instead of benefitting from a bogus amnesty.
Hezbollah has, and its list of victims is long.
And yes, it would have been much better if ALL had been jailed instead of benefitting from a bogus amnesty.
Hezbollah has, and its list of victims is long.
12. People in Lebanon are not worried that Geagea, Jumblatt and Hariri would lodge a bullet in their head. Yes, they have a criminal past and I want them out of politics, but they can disagree with them without fearing for our life.
With Hezbollah, not so.
With Hezbollah, not so.
13. In 2005, liberals and leftists struggled about supporting the March 14 leadership. We had no illusion that they would lead political reform, in fact we knew they would block it (and they did, starting with the electoral pact between the big four).
14. But we understood that without state sovereignty and a process to disarm Hezbollah, political reform would be elusive. This is a compromise that did not pay off, in part because the March 14 bosses, incompetent and on the defense, had a greater stake in preserving the system.
15. That much was clear way before 2016, when Hariri and Geagea agreed to a deal with Aoun and Hezbollah over the presidency.
The killing of Samir Kassir and others were debilitating, and the sidelining of the few reformists among the March 14 crowd evidence of weakness.
The killing of Samir Kassir and others were debilitating, and the sidelining of the few reformists among the March 14 crowd evidence of weakness.
16. In late 2006, after the summer war and as Hezbollah and Aoun paralyzed political and economic life (one of many times they did so), I sat at a seminar on Lebanon with Western luminaries.
17. A Western academic seen as a reference on Hezbollah proclaimed that the Hezbollah-Aoun alliance was the true reformist, anti-corruption camp in Lebanon. Way too many heads shook in approval, some impressed with the analytical brilliance. Tell me, how did this work?
18. Today, an issue that is arising among revolutionaries is the sequencing: should political change (and the ouster of this political elite) come first, or Hezbollah's disarmament? This is a main fracture line within.
To be fair, some revolutionaries are actually pro-Hezbollah.
To be fair, some revolutionaries are actually pro-Hezbollah.
19. The arguments of the political change camp first are that it is too difficult to do both and that Hezbollah would resist and potentially lash out. It would seek a Hezbollah promise to not use its weapons while political change happen and the state strengthen.
20. This strategy is bound to fail AND to empower Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which is not well known for holding its promises (remember Baabda 2012?), will have an interest to see revolutionaries dismantle the political system and weaken its rivals, before pocketing the whole thing.
21. Does one really believe that Hezbollah will allow political change to extend to the Shia community, where dissent is severely deterred and punished (see every election since 2005)? What about Iran, for whom Hezbollah is an ideological and security extension?
22. More importantly, this strategy explicitly acknowledges and caves to Hezbollah's blackmail and ability to coerce. @nadimhoury says it clearly: "the country cannot afford such a confrontation." Yet we can afford one with all the rest of the political class?
23. Hezbollah is not a normal political actor in Lebanon. It is not as bad as the others. It is uniquely powerful and dangerous. It now protects the political order in Lebanon, which must be confronted as a whole.
A few additional, disorganized points: I made several typos and omitted some important words (including a critical NOT). Apologies
I don’t believe that Hezbollah is directly to blame for the blast. All the known evidence so far points to a dramatic accident and experts are quite convincing. I will wait for evidence before forming a different opinion.
A friend texted me that Lebanon had a choice between a mafia and a militia, and it was easier to take on the mafia. For me, Hezbollah is both mafia and militia, which is why there should be no sequencing.
I wrote about the impossibility of political reform as long as Hezbollah remains above the state and uses the political system to shield its weapons in 2008 https://carnegie-mec.org/sada/20754
To prove my point, I received several messages from friends/contacts telling me they agreed with me but wouldn’t say so on Twitter because they might face coercion or intimidation.
Institutional corruption and mismanagement preceded Hezbollah and is not Hezbollah’s doing alone. But Hezbollah is now involved, complicit and a key beneficiary.
Confronting the political system is first and foremost a Lebanese responsibility. Dealing with Hezbollah requires international and regional engagement, including with Iran.
Disarming Hezbollah requires a discussion about a national security strategy to protect the country, a discussion that Hezbollah has resisted and undermined at every turn. https://qifanabki.com/2010/01/12/u-s-military-assistance-and-the-laf/
Changing the political system must be a holistic endeavor. Sectarianism should be abolished. I am on record saying ‘take away the presidency from the Maronites’.
I can’t stress enough the point that if you create a false equivalence between Hezbollah and other Lebanese actors, you are at best misguided and uninformed, at worst an apologist, and regardless, wrong.
A few criticism of my thread were that my analysis leads to conflict. First, separate assessment from recommendation. You can honestly and fairly disagree with my conclusion, but if you disagree with the assessment bc you disagree with the conclusion, then reflect a bit.
Second, who would initiate this conflict except Hezbollah? Who else has the power, the planning, the resources, the manpower to do this?
