1/ We are approaching a year since India's current Minister of Defence, in a clearly scripted speech, put a pretty big nail in the coffin of India's No First Use policy. It's still there. NFU is precisely a commitment to not use nukes first no matter what the circumstances. So... https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status/1162276901055893504

2/ ...why would he do this? In @Journal_IS, @clary_co and I had earlier noted long standing discomfort among India's security elite about an absolute NFU policy, because they wanted to leave open the option of preemption, possibly preemptive counterforce: https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00340

3/ Singh's speech, further gutting NFU, came after our article and provides a valuable datapoint. The fact that there has been no official contradiction even a year later is highly suggestive to us. Others such as @frank11285, @splalwani, @nktpnd, @shashj have noted this as well.

4/ We argued that India may have an interest in preemptive counterforce, but may not be able to do it fully, putting it in the worst of all worlds. Some thoughtful responses, by @RRajagopalanJNU here argue India can never do this, and has no interest. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-counterforce-a-question-of-evidence-66126/

5/ We may quibble about interest, but it's hard to square what looks like "excess" capabilities and accuracy that could put India, in a position down the road, to in extremis think it might have a sporting chance. The most persuasive criticism, to us, is India can never get there

6/ The most curious criticism I've heard comes from those who argue that India is going to be the military fulcrum against China, wants to sell it ISR, ASW, reduce the bottlenecks in its plutonium production, but are then surprised at the temptations that might create elsewhere.

7/ You can't have it both ways: if India is going to be the capable military in the Indo-Pacific, it will have a lot of the support platforms to at least think about, and potentially be seduced, by the idea of damage limitation against Pakistan.

8/ In the past 15 months, India wants us to believe it has twice deployed its lone SSBN at the height of crises with Pakistan and China. India cannot have a continuous deterrent patrol model, so flushing it out is a loaded decision, pun intended.

9/ My overall point is that those who argue that this is the same Indian nuclear doctrine and posture from twenty years ago are either missing important changes or want to do so. The security envt and India’s capabilities have evolved, as has thus India’s nuclear posture. END