Your Friendly Butch Anarchist Live-Tweet reading: The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Part 1

If you like my work/this helps your understanding and you want to show your appreciation, you can send me a tip at Squarecash: $butchanarchy | Venmo: @ genderchaos

If there’s enough interest in this I’ll continue through the manual & perhaps even on to other books in the future!

Introduction:

Posted about this elsewhere but it’s vitally important and is one of the first topics in the intro. The overall goal of counterinsurgency is to separate the civilian population from the insurgents. The general population is the lifeblood of insurgency. (p. XXV)

Further down on this point they talk about how this means that they need to kill less civilians and avoid collateral damage, because it turns the civilian population more towards solidarity with insurgents. It also risks turning international approval from the occupying force.

They seem bemoan this, saying “The costs of killing non-combatants finally register on the ledger.” (p. XXVII) Which pretty much summarizes how much the U.S. military values human life, esp the lives of civilians in other countries.

Since we can’t just indiscriminately kill civilians anymore, what is an occupying force to do? Manual answers this like it’s a shocking pronouncement: take on more risk. Use less force. Instead of just mowing people down whenever I guess.

(p. XXIX) Two takes from the end of this subsection.

1) lol cry more

2) insurgent asymmetrical tactics are highly effective and so deeply frustrating to occupying forces that they can’t help but whine about it in their tactical manuals

Next subsection is called “Nonmilitary Capacity is the Exit Strategy”: says U.S. civilian political leadership is an vital aspect in winning conflicts.

Also that that leadership has been entirely incompetent in regards to the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. Shocker.

Apparently a critique of the new U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine is that “its restraint and political correctness threaten to emasculate American military power.” (p. XXXIII)

and I’m fuckin dying

At least some degree of self-awareness here:
“Yet history provides plenty of reason to doubt counterinsurgency claims about a kinder and gentler counterinsurgency. During Vietnam, the U.S. spoke of winning hearts and minds even as it carpet bombed rural areas.” (p. XXXIV)

In the subsection titled “Nice Guys Finish Last” they write that counterinsurgents, when faced with how invisible insurgents can be, often prefer the brutal strategy of totally erasing distinctions between combatants and non-combatants.

To this ^^ the author of the intro (Sarah Sewall, formerly served in the DoD) is basically like “I know it’s really hard, but, like I said earlier, it’s actually politically and militarily better to NOT indiscriminately raze entire villages to the ground. ” (me paraphrasing)

Believes Americans have been sheilded from the real costs of war in recent decades, and are now very resistant to sacrifice. “The American way of war has long been characterized by the substitution of firepower for manpower, which helps protect U.S combatants.” (p. XXXVIII)

Damn honestly surprised by the level of realness here. (p. XXXVIII)

Generally, we Americans are totally down with war we pay for so long as we don’t have to deal with any of the dirty consequences ourselves.

“Counterinsurgency favors peace over justice. Revolution destabilizes the status quo in the name of justice.” (p. XXXIX)

Look. The enemy knows what the fucking score is. They know what they’re fighting for: Order. It’s long past time we figure out the same: Revolutionary Justice

(p. X1)
What anarchists have been saying. Electoralism is just a meaningless release valve and will be gone in a fuckin snap if that’s what the state requires to maintain its sovereignty.

They know it. You should too. This is the fight we’re in.

Okay, I just hit the end of that chapter and realized it was not the main Introduction, but the Introduction to the University of Chaicago Press Edition. Still quite enlightening!
Gonna take 5 then start on the actual introduction. If you like this hit up my tip jar if you can!

My Venmo and Cashap

This is quite a bit of work already but also lots of fun and I’m real glad y’all are appreciating it so far! If I get enough interest in this first part today I’ll continue on through the manual. I’ll be back at after I take my dog outside

Alright, starting the official Introduction:

Starting off with a recognition that the U.S.’s extreme firepower capacity, most “enemies” do not try to meet U.S. forces directly or compete in those terms, but seek to exhaust “U.S. national will” (p.1i)

So, with insurrection.

To combat what they recognize is a HUGE challenge to the U.S. military, the Intro recommends that members of the military get creative and seek to understand historical trends.

Let me hammer the point: insurgents pose a massive challenge to the biggest military on earth.

Why I want to stress this point so much: it’s easy to get overwhelmed by the militarized might of the State. But don’t EVER forget that all that firepower hasn’t won them a war in DECADES because insurgent tactics are devestatingly effective.

Keep on fighting, loves. We can win.

(p. 1ii)

Note especially the sentence “Thus, counterinsurgents often have to ‘come from behind’ when fighting an insurgency.”

This is part of why we say that counterinsurgency tactics often happen AFTER an action (ex: trying to discredit people involved in direct action)

“In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly— the better learning organization— usually wins.” (p. 1ii)

This is why it is so important for us to be fluid (“be water”) in our tactics. To not get entrenched in one way of acting. Essentially: be anarchistic.

(p. 1iii) “Forces that learn COIN effectively have generally: proved open to soliciting and evaluating advice from the local people on a conflict zone”

Why we do NOT accept cop-collaborators in our movements. Regardless of their intentions, they are part of counterinsurgency.

“Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not.” (p. 1iii)

“Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions.” (p. 1iv)

^^^ these two sentences have much to tell us. The entirety of the official Intro to this manual stresses the necessity of adaptability and learning. This is what the State is the WORST at. This is its fatal flaw. This is what we are BEST at. Exercise your ability to adapt.

And that’s the end of both Introductions! I’m going to stop there, as to not overwhelm everyone with too much at once, including myself. Thank you for following along with me, and please show your support by throwing something in my tip jar if you can. Much appreciated

It seems like there’s pretty significant interest in this, so I’m definitely going to be doing this again. Next time we’ll work through the next chapter “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency”

Not entirely sure when I’ll be starting it next, but I’m hoping to do this once or twice a week, so keep an eye on my page and I’ll make sure I pin each new Part as I go so you can keep up even if you miss seeing it live. Thank y’all again for all your interest and support!