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Very pleased to announce that my report on Iran's nuclear decision-making is out today.
First order of business, I want to thank @RichardMNephew and the rest of the team for making it all happen. And @BrewerEricM & 2 reviewers for their very helpful comments.
Let's dig in:
First order of business, I want to thank @RichardMNephew and the rest of the team for making it all happen. And @BrewerEricM & 2 reviewers for their very helpful comments.
Let's dig in:
This report has been in the works for years. It uses interviews with negotiators and the nuclear archive, as well as other primary & secondary sources.
But it's by no means a perfectly complete and clear assessment of Iran's nuclear decision-making, but a first crack at it.
But it's by no means a perfectly complete and clear assessment of Iran's nuclear decision-making, but a first crack at it.
There's a lot we don't know about Iranian decision-making but what we do know can help us formulate responses to Iran's nuclear activities, especially as Iran shrinks the time needed to get enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon should it make the decision to do so.
Iran’s nuclear decision-making process is messy and it is intricate. Key power centers play a significant part in developing the framework within which decision-making occurs. But major choices on the direction of the program happen with buy-in from across the political system.
Importantly for US policymakers thinking about engaging Iran in 2021, Iran’s fundamental decision about whether or not to negotiate with the United States and the regime’s toplines and bottom lines will be determined by the system and likely will not change.
Any difference will manifest itself in the conduct of the negotiations and rapport with the United States, how effectively the Iranian delegation negotiating with the US and its partners can navigate its own country’s politics, and the specifics left to that team’s discretion.
