@BeijingPalmer's article has provoked some long-overdue discussion about which "greatest hits" from history we use. I see a lot of debate now focused on (European) classics -- whether to use or not, cancel culture, spirited defenses of their study, etc. Sure, whatever. 1/

My point has been that I never understood why we would use European history to predict Asia's future. As I pointed out a few weeks ago, the onus is on us area specialists (and I proudly claim that term!) to show that different regions of the world were, in fact, different. 2/

If not, and if our ostensibly "universal" theories that were actually inductively derived from European experience truly are universal, then knock yourself out; use Thucydides. Your choice of history is simply different preference than mine. But, if there truly are different 3/

patterns of IR; if there are different foundational components to international orders; if different norms and values lead to different behaviors -- then we absolutely have to take that other history seriously. Both for our theories, and for our expectations today about state 4/

behavior. And, it is our task to show that different regions experienced different patterns and orders. That was my tweet to somebody a few days ago about "order" as defining how units interact. I and my coauthors have argued strenuously that, in fact, in East Asian history, 5/

The concept of a world composed entirely of equal, sovereign, independent states that viewed each other primarily through the lens of relative capabilities did not exist. I have at least 3 more papers in various stages, as well as lots already published 6/ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445905

@ma_xinru and I argue that the dominant cause of "great power" collapse in East Asian history was internal decay, not external challenge. Exploring what this means for rising and declining powers leads to very different implications for today: most obviously, we need to take 7/

care of ourselves first, and indeed that is where the greatest danger to the US lies: at home, from domestic challenges to our economy, our society, our political life, and our environment. And, when we look at China, their greatest challenges are domestic, as well. But more 8/

than that, I don't even care if we are right or not. Rather, the larger point is that we need to take seriously the possibility that different parts of the world have different histories, and those histories challenge both our "theories" that are really little more than 9/

backwards induction to curve fit some ideas to a set of stylized facts about European history. That might seem a bit harsh, but maybe I'll do another thread that shows it. But remember my big point -- I don't care about Europe! I don't want to argue about Thucydides. Rather, 10/

Let's see what the rest of the world has to offer to our theories and our explanations about the world today. /End for now. :)

okay, last one! more succinctly: I find it perplexing that we argue about different interpretations of Thucydides as if it will tell us anything about China today. Rather, why don't we look at China today to see what we can learn? I know, I know -- revolutionary idea, huh?