A thread on the recent news of DoD's withdrawal of ~12k troops from Germany: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35181/pentagon-details-trumps-plan-to-pull-nearly-12000-troops-out-of-delinquent-germany 1/25

I arrived at the Pentagon in late 2014, as DoD's response to Russia's invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine was ramping up after decades in which Russia had been an afterthought (at best) in DoD strategy and planning. 2/25

It's tough to describe the state of DoD's thinking about Russia in 2014, but the best term is shambolic. Nearly every part of DoD--OSD, JS, DIA, EUCOM, the Services--had allowed their Russia-focused staff and thinking to atrophy. 3/25

We didn't even know what we didn't know regarding Russia. Most Russia experts had retired or "reclassified." Our initial analyses and wargames were Lovecraftian exercises in groping around in the dark, trying to comprehend the unknown or long forgotten. 4/25

Little by little (and not without mistakes along the way), DoD built its understanding and translated this knowledge into policy and investments, specifically ERI/EDI, along with NATO initiatives like EFP and the VJTF. 5/25

These changes weren't always popular. I vividly recall pushing to increase forward posture (esp. higher echelon HQs) and develop training areas in EUCOM and being told by a colleague that it was the "f*¢king stupidest thing" she'd ever heard. 6/25

...in spite of the fact that countless wargames and analyses indicated that increasing and improving U.S./NATO forward posture was the single largest contributor to improving operational outcomes and, by inference, conventional deterrence. 7/25

Often, those of us who cared about this issue ran headlong into a bureaucracy that had spent the last several decades pulling forces out of Europe and turning EUCOM into a logistics/crisis response command. 8/25

This continued into the NDS, as the Pentagon's attention shifted to China. We kept arguing that DoD couldn't abandon its role as security guarantor of Europe, especially given the costs (low), the risks (high), and our ability to predict Putin's behavior (poor). 9/25

The end result of this work was, in Pentagon terms, a massive win. Bureaucracy is mostly Sisyphean, but every now and again, you get the rock up the hill. The post-2014 shift in EUCOM was one of those times. 10/25

In 4 years, our assessments of the military balance in Europe went from frightening to acceptable. We went from being clueless to having a workable theory of victory against some of Russia's most dangerous COAs. 11/25

Posture shifts drove much of this delta. There's no good replacement for ABCTs, Fires BDEs, and Div/Corps HQs for C2, etc. in meeting Russia's threat to eastern NATO Allies. I strongly believe in the hammer of US airpower, but it needs an anvil to slow down the enemy. 12/25

Critics/cynics will say: ERI/EDI was an OCO slush fund, Russia was an Army ploy for relevance, DoD was too focused on deterring a conventional fight Russia doesn't want, and Russia will shift to maintain its preferred correlation of forces. 13/25

All true, to a degree. But all pale in comparison to the myriad ways Russia could've exploited NATO's weakness and how our responses usually resulted in long wars and/or cataclysmic escalation. ERI/EDI was, and remains an ounce of prevention vs. megatons of cure. 14/25

After all this, the announcement of the withdrawal from Germany--particularly the shift of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) to CONUS--comes as a gut punch. And here's why... 15/25

The shift from Germany isn't bad, per se. DoD should've long ago re-thought a EUCOM posture based on where our forces were on V-E day. Grafenwöhr/Vilseck and Hohenfels were great bases when we were worried about the Fulda Gap, but they're less relevant to the Suwalki gap. 16/25

Likewise, shifting some TACAIR from Spangdahlem to Aviano is a wash strategically and operationally. It's maybe even a small improvement, given Aviano's proximity to the Med and Black Sea. 17/25

Moving the 2CR to CONUS is the kicker. While "just" a Stryker BCT, the 2CR upgraded its Strykers for fighting Russia. Though weakly armored, their improved guns threaten Russian armor, and their light weight & wheels provide road mobility & flexibility. 18/25

The 2CR was designed and trained for fighting in Europe. It had unique experience and relationships. It could've been a "free safety" covering from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Now it will deploy back to CONUS as just another part of the Army's rotation base. 19/25

Barring a miracle, EUCOM will never get the unit back. They may rotate through, but rotational presence is temporary presence. Congress won't almost certainly won't allow the 2CR to forward station in EUCOM--and take its 6k jobs (and countless knock-on jobs)--again. 20/25

This is why, despite the NDS calling for reduced capacity to buy capability, the FY19 & 20 budgets increased Army force structure. Creating new units was the only way to forward-station key enablers like HQs, Fires, and SHORADS to EUCOM. 21/25

This shift to CONUS will decrease EUCOM readiness and raise the cost of keeping the deterrence posture we rebuilt after 2014. Each rotational unit forward requires AT LEAST two at home station. The costs of deploying and re-setting them afterward aren't trivial. 22/25

For more on these tradeoffs, see https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3359.pdf , and https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/reverse-the-tide-a-forward-stationed-army-is-better-for-america/. 23/25

This doesn't even account for the costs in terms of unit/personnel relocation and base realignment, as @StaciePettyjohn notes here: https://twitter.com/StaciePettyjohn/status/1288914222240485380 24/25

More than this, the shift pokes our key ally Germany in the eye while simultaneously undermining our commitment to NATO after we've literally spent six years and billions of dollars to arrest the erosion of our position in Europe. 25/25