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Big pre-election development:
finally new signs that US intelligence is beta-testing how to communicate directly to American voters on threats that target them in the information domain.
We should applaud it!
My latest for @SURfdn #defusingdisinfo /1 https://standuprepublic.com/current-information-operation-topics-us-intelligence-is-finally-figuring-out-how-to-communicate-with-the-american-public-on-threats-in-our-information-domain-and-we-should-all-pay-attention/
finally new signs that US intelligence is beta-testing how to communicate directly to American voters on threats that target them in the information domain.
We should applaud it!
My latest for @SURfdn #defusingdisinfo /1 https://standuprepublic.com/current-information-operation-topics-us-intelligence-is-finally-figuring-out-how-to-communicate-with-the-american-public-on-threats-in-our-information-domain-and-we-should-all-pay-attention/
That the IC is willing to discuss tactics and narrative in more detail, and in ways that will better prepare individuals for self-defense against the campaigns of adversarial powers — particularly the Kremlin, but also China and others — is a big step forward. /2
Dems were critical that this stmt didn’t go far enough — but @NCSCgov saying “Foreign efforts to influence or interfere with our elections are a direct threat to the fabric of our democracy” days before AG says “foreign interference—meh” is a big deal /3
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2135-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-100-days-until-election-2020
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/2135-statement-by-ncsc-director-william-evanina-100-days-until-election-2020
The NCSC also highlighted that multiple adversarial nations are now targeting America — copying/adapting techniques & tactics that Russia pioneered — to influence the information environment in advance of the 2020 elections. /4
“This is the beginning of a conversation with the American public,” an ODNI official commented. “There is more to follow.”
Yes, please. More of this.
It is up to the NCSC to develop trust with the American electorate. There isn’t much time. But this is a start. /5
Yes, please. More of this.
It is up to the NCSC to develop trust with the American electorate. There isn’t much time. But this is a start. /5
I would point to the successful models of this established by the Lithuanians in particular: non-partisan intelligence/govt communications on threats in the information domain are a great asset to the media and the public in assessing what is targeting a nation /6
This was followed by two stories where the IC started releasing more information on tactics and narratives.
There was this one from @etuckerAP /7 https://apnews.com/3acb089e6a333e051dbc4a465cb68ee1
There was this one from @etuckerAP /7 https://apnews.com/3acb089e6a333e051dbc4a465cb68ee1
... and this one from @julianbarnes & @SangerNYT
Both stories focused on Russian-connected sites that were amplifying coronavirus conspiracies and disinformation.
Some big things to understand from these stories /8 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/politics/russia-disinformation-coronavirus.html
Both stories focused on Russian-connected sites that were amplifying coronavirus conspiracies and disinformation.
Some big things to understand from these stories /8 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/28/us/politics/russia-disinformation-coronavirus.html
This new information focused not on bots/trolls, but on narrative architecture and narrative laundering, which points to how widespread, broad-based, deeply-embedded, and very serious the Kremlin’s information warfare against the American public really is. /9
Narrative laundering relies on a sophisticated long-term effort to build up networks of proxy “experts” and outlets that become established inside the American information environment and are used by to influence American debate and discourse on different subjects. /10
Essentially, it sounds like the Kremlin but doesn’t look like the Kremlin (in this case), so more people are willing to believe it.
This network of pass-throughs and sympathizers is invaluable to the Kremlin.
/11
This network of pass-throughs and sympathizers is invaluable to the Kremlin.
/11
Exposing both narrative and narrative networks is exactly the work that the intelligence community should be focused on, and exactly what they need to do a better job explaining to the American public. /12
Though only a handful of sites are directly identified, one — the “Strategic Culture Foundation” (SCF) — is identified as being **directed by** the SVR (Russian foreign intelligence)
That the IC was willing to let this be known is a big deal. Why? /13
That the IC was willing to let this be known is a big deal. Why? /13
SCF has dozens of diplomats, parliamentarians, academics, journalists writing for them. Doubt most of them know their work is advancing the interests of Russian intelligence.
SCF has also targeted US soldiers and vets with pro-Putin/pro-Russian narrative. /14
SCF has also targeted US soldiers and vets with pro-Putin/pro-Russian narrative. /14
An org that promotes SCF — part of its narrative network — was responsible for seeding & pushing the Jade Helm 2015 conspiracy, which @GenMhayden later identified as a Russian capabilities test in advance of the 2016 elex — one that went so well, Russia went all-in on 2016 IO /15
It becomes clear how the network more broadly is responsible for longterm efforts in pushing Kremlin narrative. And that it is linked directly to Russian intelligence. Boom. /16
Two more points to highlight.
1- the NYT story highlights that the campaign of former defense department official @EvelynNFarkas (running for Congress in New York State in a closely-contested primary) was a target of Russian disinfo efforts during her campaign... /17
1- the NYT story highlights that the campaign of former defense department official @EvelynNFarkas (running for Congress in New York State in a closely-contested primary) was a target of Russian disinfo efforts during her campaign... /17
... and while it’s unclear how widespread this is, it shows that Russian election interference is drilling down below the national level to the **state/local level**
While I can’t discuss other details of why this concerns me ... it concerns me. These are much softer targets./18
While I can’t discuss other details of why this concerns me ... it concerns me. These are much softer targets./18
2 - Russian information networks are amplifying Chinese disinformation narratives, especially on coronavirus.
While the IC may not publicly connect the dots on this very often, Russia, China, and Iran are increasingly coordinating activities against the US... /19
While the IC may not publicly connect the dots on this very often, Russia, China, and Iran are increasingly coordinating activities against the US... /19
... One of the domains where they most actively learn from and leverage each other’s work is the information domain.
This will continue. /20
This will continue. /20
The usual subjects — part of a narrative network of their own in which the Kremlin is never *really* a threat — are already downplaying the significance of these revelations 
But there is a lot of big stuff here. /21
But there is a lot of big stuff here. /21
Remember: a goal of the Kremlin’s info ops has always been to build a state of permanent conflict within US society. To tear us down. What Putin once described as a nation focused on its own internal problems not being able to raise its head.
Don’t play along. How? /22
Don’t play along. How? /22
First, encourage/amplify messages from the IC about threats in the information domain, threats targeting the election. Trust still needs to be earned here — but it’s a big development that the IC is more active in communicating to the public /23
Second, each of us needs to critically evaluate sources, understand objectives/narrative. If US intel identifies outlets that are part of malign influence campaigns, look at where they sit in the broader information landscape, what and who they promote.
Don’t sound like that /24
Don’t sound like that /24
Third, consider the narrative that *you* build in your posts + interactions online/on social media. Are you only contributing divisive content, or are you evaluating ways ahead? Are you playing the part that malign actors want you to play, or are you breaking the cycle? /25
Read more about this week’s developments and their significance here. LOADS of incredible detail.
/26
https://twitter.com/standuprepublic/status/1288903067002449926?s=21 https://twitter.com/standuprepublic/status/1288903067002449926
/26
https://twitter.com/standuprepublic/status/1288903067002449926?s=21 https://twitter.com/standuprepublic/status/1288903067002449926
