Acting Undersecretary of Defense James Anderson has a provocative op-ed in Today's @nytimes where he gets a lot wrong about China, nuclear policy and arms control.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/opinion/russia-china-nuclear-weapons.html

At thread

1st he asserts arms control is at a cross roads because China is close to upsetting the bilateral nuclear dynamic with Russia and US. Nope - China at arms control because Trump and co dismantling agreements and leaving nothing to replace them. 1/

Russia is America's only nuclear peer competitor and needs to remain the focus of our nuclear control and reduction efforts - mainly focused on avoiding nuclear use by accident or escalation. China has 1/10th the arsenal of US or Russia. 2/

He asserts China is moving away from it small, limited arsenal of the past but fails to mention by - China concerned about US missile defense in region and at home and seeks most likely to maintain a secure second strike capability to deter nuclear strikes against it by US. 3/

China has restrained its nuclear capabilities but seems to be responding both to US missile defense and prospect of enhanced US missile and conventional capabilities in region as part of pivot. 4/

It is right to track China's capabilities but to ignore and not even mention most likely causes (from us) ignores the dynamic underway in the region. 5/

Anderson cites Defense Intelligence Agency estimate China might double its nuclear arsenal in next decade. Interesting that DIA always among the most worst case and often wrong. Is there a unified US intelligence view? Does DIA say why? Those would be useful to know. 6/

Even if DIA is right (it can happen) China would have 1/5th US and RF arsenals. Does not represent a strategic shift in deterrence or nuclear requirements. Could alter US planning but we have both the arsenal and capabilities to address if needed. 7/

Amazingly, he suggests China's build up might spark a US-Russian nuclear arms race - looking to scapegoat someone else for US and Russia's decisions. I have studied nuclear strategy and arms control for 35 years - We are in an arms race with Russia. 8/

US withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, RF pursuit of intermediate range nuclear forces, new US low yield weapons and modernization by both sides have undermined both strategic and crisis and arms control stability. We can't stop it is we don't know we are in it. 9/

China is reacting to us, not seeking to achieve some new capability. There is no evidence I have seen to suggest China seeks to eliminate America's second strike capability or that it thinks it can build up to US and RF before we can respond. 10/

Anderson then openly states that we must rely on worst case analysis of China's forces to size and operate our own. This is the same insanity that led to US and RF building 35,000 nuclear weapons each during Cold War. It should not be the basis for US planning now. 11/

Worse case planning drives US to have more nuclear weapons than it needs and creates the very dynamic that can lead to nuclear use through escalation or mistake that we seek to avoid. It seems Acting Undersec Anderson missed this part of the Cold War nuclear history. 12/

Anderson then repeats the tired Trump claim that RF should help get China to join current US-RF arms control talks. No one believes Trump and company are serious about a new arms control approach. They lack the personnel, track record or details ground work to pursue one. 13/

Evidence: No one appointed to key role running State Department arms control bureau for over one year and even Anderson is an acting. And no sign US has done intell work to determine what we can verify if negotiated. 14/

Then Anderson cites obligation in the Nonproliferation Treaty to end the arms race and negotiate in good faith. US has rejected this obligation - he might want to talk with Chris Ford, acting Undersec of State who has led the charge in rejecting any US obligation to disarm. 15/

Another sign of dysfunction and lack of coordination inside USG? 16/

There is good reason engage China on nuclear weapons and strategic stability. US can pursue both, but Trump approach won't get us there. trump has prioritized the wrong things and not created any possible path to succeed - and in fact most doubt Trump really involved at all. 17/

How? US needs to make talks with PRC on nuclear and stability a priority. It needs to be prepared to acknowledge we are in a mutually deterred relationship with China and that we do not seek to deny PRC a 2nd strike capability. And we need to extend US-RF New START Treaty. 18/

Cannot have future AC with PRC is we kill US-RF arms control. We also need to avoid worse case planning with PRC, and do a net assessment on how US missile defense and possible missile deployments in region will affect Chinese actions - likely driving Chinese build up. 19/

Lastly, we need to have actual proposals for how to engage China and consider mutual constraints. now we are asking China to freeze at their levels, where we are at a 10-1 advantage. Non-starter. Would we constrain regional MD? Are we interested in a global INF regime? 20/

And lastly is US prepared to continue to reduce to a level where US-RF and PRC (and UK and FR for that matter) nuclear forces are in the same ballpark so that broader multilateral constraints make sense. For this, Anderson and Trump seem to have no plan. 21/

We should think hard about nuclear risks from China, but focus on preventing use, serious engagement, and keeping the framework of US-RF arms control in place by extending New START to get that process rolling. A @NYTimes op-ed is not a replacement for strategy. end/