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If China *may* double its arsenal in the next decade (~200 to ~400 warheads) and does not mate warheads to missiles... I don't see how this impacts extending New START 2021-2026. https://twitter.com/_FrankKuhn/status/1288411435186388995
If the US and Russia were talking about reducing SDNWs to 600 and SDVs to 300 before 2030, maybe that is a different question. These timelines do not add up. And i've seen no interest by either the US or Russia to race down to these levels.
"But renewing the treaty for the United States and Russia without conditions for bringing China into a broader arms control process carries risks for future security, even if today it seems the easiest course to take."
I don't think so.
I don't think so.
Attaching conditions to NST extension guarantees these risks appear today, unless the U.S. plan in 2021 is to "keep pace" (i.e., stay very far ahead) of China's arsenal through a build up/upload.
It seems the US should be much more concerned about China's conventional military expansion and behavior below the nuclear threshold. US nuclear recap./improvement will happen, perhaps with hiccups and adjustments on the road to 2046.
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-01/54914-NuclearForces.pdf
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-01/54914-NuclearForces.pdf
But the only scenario in which the US nuclear arsenal s somehow disadvantaged to that of China in the future is if it fails to limit Russia's nuclear forces, and Russia builds up. This would force the US to sink more resources into maintaining quan/qual parity with Russia...
...while China responds with an accelerated build up.
There's your three-way arms race: it's far more likely to happen without New START extension than with it. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/04/importance-of-new-start-treaty-pub-80834
There's your three-way arms race: it's far more likely to happen without New START extension than with it. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/04/importance-of-new-start-treaty-pub-80834
There's no evidence that holding New START extension hostage will get China to the table. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/23/trump-china-russia-new-arms-control-agreement-start/
If the US wants to talk to China, have "asks." it's all been public theater to this point (ref incorrect flag stunt - another proud 2020 moment) - maybe the next item in megaphone diplomacy can be a detailed proposal for a US-China arms control agreement? https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-united-states-china-and-the-future-of-arms-control/
And China (and the P5) *should* consider their NPT Art. VI obligations. But the starting point for that discussion is a continuation of New START, barring success in Vienna this week in achieving a new U.S.-Russia agreement to reduce further.
US threats to ignore its own NPT obligations to secure Chinese reductions, when the vast majority of non-nuclear weapons states view the US and Russia as not having done enough to reduce their arsenals, is a strategy formed in an alternate reality.
Of course, if the end goal here is to achieve a trilateral agrmnt, but barring that, extend New START, it is still achievable for the Trump Administration. But adding arms control to the current throat-clearing exercise on China just exposes a bad negotiating strategy to this pt.
