Another great podcast, featuring #wirecard prominently yet again!

About 36:00 in, TC asks how overpaying for acquisitions helps perpetuate the fraud.

In addition to @DonutShorts insights, I share what I learned from the hardcore $WDIQ accounts:

#RoundTripping

1/n https://twitter.com/TESLAcharts/status/1287478462417174530

In 2015 $WDI paid 326 M€ to a controlled intermediary for an asset that $WDI could have purchased directly for 37 M€.

That intermediary then *invests* part of its gains directly and indirectly in that same asset and perhaps also other $WDI assets.

Basically $WDI shareholder money gets converted ("laundered") into EBITDA that gets consolidated, with an efficiency ratio of say 50%.

If $WDI was trading at 25x EBITDA at the time then 290M€ of asset-flipping profit translates into market cap of 3.6bn€!

The company does not profit from that. But the main shareholder Markus Braun does!

Notice the obvious analogy with $TSLA and @elonmusk :

FSD revenue recognition has close to 100% EBITDA, and $TSLA trades at about 50 x EBITDA.

48M$ of FSD or ca. 2.5bn$ market cap!

Which helps @Elonmusk directly via shareholder and as sole beneficiary of bonus payments related to market cap.

So many things Markus Braun could have learned from @Elonmusk, to hold out couple of months longer...

#TeslaFraudIsBiggerThanWirecardFraud

Remember the $TSLA acquisition of the truck-transport company. They clearly did not do that for the trucks! Was there some round-tripping involved?

The Maxwell acquisition may have resulted in a bit of round-tripping, perhaps at lower "efficiency ratio".

The tinfoiliest of all $TSLA round-tripping allegation involves $TSLA selling cars to Mexican drug cartels, whereby $TSLA does not even have to produce the cars.

The efficiency ratio is then simply determined by the split between $TSLA and cartel.

$TSLAQ