I have been following this case with interest because of its inclusion in my Master’s dissertation. I wrote about the relationship between deception and consent and whether the Sexual Offences Act 2003 adequately protects victims of rape. In case anyone is interested, I have [1]

Made my dissertation available to read at this link: https://docs.google.com/document/d/12gHk2BFaoKOksxXPFNddUmo0N0UatUvSr2SggsEodCc/edit?usp=sharing [2]

An arguable peculiarity with the SOA 2003 is that, in cases of consent given as a result of deception, the courts must make an “all or nothing” decision: either D is guilty of rape or there is no crime (Temkin and Ashworth 2004, p.492). Lawrance’s solicitor had expressed [3]

Concern that to uphold Lawrance’s conviction for rape would be to risk criminalising “large sections” of the public. If, as this implies, obtaining consent through deception is so commonplace that large sections of the public would become criminals in the eyes of the law if [4]

The court had upheld the decision that lying about having had a vasectomy is rape, I am deeply concerned. The law must strike a balance between protecting sexual and bodily autonomy, and criminalising only those deserving of criminal punishment; as I discussed in my [5]

Dissertation, the question of where we draw the line between rape by deception and immoral but not criminal deception is far from straightforward, but due to want of a lesser offence for obtaining consent by deception, this decision means no crime is committed when consent is [6]

Obtained through lies about fertility and, by extension, this particular victim’s risk of becoming pregnant. Do we want a society where this kind of violation of free choice is no crime? #lawrance [7]