https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/25/why-the-eu-is-becoming-more-like-a-chekhov-play

EU treaty like a badly-written play. Lots of guns sitting unused. Chekhov would not approve.

Except now, some of them being fired. Pew! https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/23/why-the-eu-is-becoming-more-like-a-chekhov-play

Commission pointing a particularly large gun at Ireland and its fellow low-tax friends. But the push to end qualified majorities is being renewed. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/23/why-the-eu-is-becoming-more-like-a-chekhov-play

Backdoor integration now in vogue as frontdoor integration not possible. Throughout 1990s and 2000s, EU ripped up rulebook and started again. Treaties changed every few years. Now idea of treaty change makes most (but not all) diplos puke. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/23/why-the-eu-is-becoming-more-like-a-chekhov-play

So they're using the tools available: dusting off unused bits of the treaty and interpreting them in new(ish) ways.

Best comparison with this is the US, where the commerce clause - just 16 words saying federal government regulated inter-state commerce - allowed the federal government to muscle into, well, pretty much anything. The single market provides a similar tool. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/23/why-the-eu-is-becoming-more-like-a-chekhov-play

Doing things by the backdoor can backfire. Small-print constitutionalism can be unpopular. Reinterpretation can lead to anger. If supposedly temporary measures become permanent, voters may be annoyed. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/23/why-the-eu-is-becoming-more-like-a-chekhov-play

Likewise, stopping member states from being able to veto things would probably speed up integration. But it would also piss a lot of people off. Without consensus, you're left with coercion--governments forced to follow policy against their will.

This problem is surmountable. But the notion that an EU without vetoes is a land of milk and honey is a false one.