It’s interesting seeing the replies here.

Almost all of the replies see “Airpower” as an supporting effort to land power, not as a power in itself.

If you only see airpower through the eyes of your own parochial lens, then you don’t understand airpower or joint operations.

1/4 https://twitter.com/azmarayfury/status/1285689310860267521

People should read Wylie.

He discusses how soldiers (I would lump Marines into this) generally think airpower should be subordinated to their ends.

And he discusses how seapower and airpower folks generally don’t seek to subordinate other domains.

Which is interesting WRT China; that would mainly NOT a land campaign.

And still we approach the problem like a land power thinker does, trying to subordinate air- and seapower to the ends of land.

That doesn’t make sense in a naval or air campaign.

To understand joint operations, you need to address what an air-centric theory of success would look like. And a naval-centric theory. And a land-centric theory.

Aviation can help with all.

But not all aviation is properly “airpower.”