“Huawei executives have gone public since Tuesday’s decision saying that they hope the British government will rethink, apparently encouraged by the results of back-channel contacts.” https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jul/18/pressure-from-trump-led-to-5g-ban-britain-tells-huawei

I have no proof but experience tells me that this behind closed door briefing does happen and is unfortunate and will cause the Prime Minister more heartache and PRC pressure. Many former telecoms people work in @DCMS and view all this security stuff as trade protectionism.

I think this story leads me to two serious conclusions about the UK’s mid-level civil service dealing with digital infrastructure:
1. It’s been courted and socialized by PRC telecoms
2. It has out-of-date and dangerous views of telecom primacy in regulation and of PRC tech policy

Finally, the UK must come out of this whole affair and
1. Clean house in DCMS & BT
2. Give primacy back to security services over digital infrastructure decisions
3. De-politicize investment screening and air-gap the Prime Minister from foreign coercion
4. Create 5 Eye Standards

Things raised in the 2013 @UKParliament Intelligence Committee report that remain true to this day - as this Guardian Article reveals: https://www.parliament.uk/documents/other-committees/intelligence-security/Critical-National-Infrastructure-Report.pdf

1. There is a serious disconnect between the UK’s inward investment policy and its national security policy.

2. Mid-ranking @cabinetofficeuk officials chose not to inform ministers of Huawei’s inclusion until a year after the contract was signed.

3. @cabinetofficeuk officials informed Ministers that there was nothing they could do to block Huawei’s inclusion, explaining the lack of information. This was untrue.

4. @Cabinet officials were aware of this at the time but assessed that the potential trade, financial and diplomatic consequences of using them would be too significant. IOW, they lied in order to save costs and avoid antagonizing China.

5. At the time, telecoms were not required to inform the government of contracts awarded to foreign powers or untrusted vendors. BT did inform HMG, but but mid-rank civil servants kept ministers in the dark - a serious oversight which has caused this current 2 year crisis.

6. the 1984 Telecoms Act was unclear as to responsibility if HMG blocked a contract, but HMG could have gone back to parliament to give stronger powers or assign responsibility. They chose not to.. (muddle through)

7. Ministers only found out about Huawei’s inclusion when civil servants sought approval to run checks on its equipment. Fait accompli.

8. Security Service told the Committee in early 2008 that, theoretically, the Chinese State may be able to exploit any vulnerabilities in Huawei’s equipment in order to gain some access to the BT network, which would provide them with an
attractive espionage opportunity.