Ananda Chakrabarty, biotech pioneer, died July 10. Working for General Electric, he developed a micro-organism genetically engineered to eat oil. This led to a landmark 1980 Supreme Court decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, on life form patents.

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https://today.uic.edu/obituary-ananda-m-chakrabarty

GE/Chakrabarty applied for a US patent on his "invention". The patent office (led by S. Diamond) initially refused. Chakrabarty sued, the case landed at the Supreme Court. The question was whether life forms were "products of nature". If yes, then life forms couldn't be patented.

The case was incredibly important. It could allow new kinds of commercialization of research. This could provide new revenues to universities where early stage research takes place (think tinkering with genes, plants, etc) and help a newly emerging biotechnology industry.

It also raised questions about moral and socioeconomic aspects of patenting life. For the first time in a patent case, civil society groups filed amicus briefs. They argued that patents on life would create consolidation in the agricultural industry (that ultimately happened).

They suggested that it would change how humans saw their dominion over nature (arguably that happened too). They cited philosophers and cited scientific evidence. They argued that this was a *moral* question that should be left to Congress because it represented the people.

But in a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS rejected these arguments and said that "anything under the sun made by man" was patentable. They also suggested that the life form patent decision was a narrow one, and had nothing to do with moral, socioeconomic, or other considerations.

The US Patent and Trademark Office ran with this decision. It quickly issued patents on genetically engineered plants and animals, and genes. And (I argue in my book) it reinforced the idea that the patent system was narrow and technical. Concern about implications didn't belong.

US civil society groups, from environmentalists to patient advocates, kept fighting. They were largely unsuccessful. But their European allies fared better. The EU and European Patent Office limited patentability on moral/socioeconomic grounds and take public concerns seriously.

Meanwhile, some US scientists started to see that life form patents could stifle innovation. High licensing fees and "patent thickets" dissuaded them from human embryonic stem cell and genetics work. Even Chakrabarty echoed these concerns in 2002. https://www.amazon.com/Owns-Life-David-Magnus-2002-04-20/dp/B01K0Q3ZEG/ref=sr_1_9?dchild=1&keywords=david+magnus&qid=1594918563&s=books&sr=1-9

Patent insiders kept insisting that critics misunderstood the system (they maintained what I call "expertise barriers", arguing that outsiders lacked knowledge/understanding to participate). And scientists largely stayed quiet, accepting that patents are the price of innovation.

Finally, in 2010 the American Civil Liberties Union initiated a case that ended in a 2013 Supreme Court case prohibiting human gene patents. But this only addresses a symptom, not the problem: the patent system doesn't adequately take its moral and social obligations seriously.

It misinterprets its commitment to the public interest and dangerously limits expertise and public participation. If you want to know more about patent politics and life form patent controversies in the US and Europe, check out my book (e-Book 30% off!) https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo25338584.html