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If you haven’t had enough Sino-Indian border crisis, here's a weekend read on key takeaways for US-India balancing efforts, and how US defense strategists might lean in to this opportunity.
But if the ice in your
is melting, I'll try to summarize: 1/ https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/revelations-and-opportunities-what-the-united-states-can-learn-from-the-sino-indian-crisis/
But if the ice in your
is melting, I'll try to summarize: 1/ https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/revelations-and-opportunities-what-the-united-states-can-learn-from-the-sino-indian-crisis/
Caught off guard by China's assertiveness, India seems keen to shift from "hedging" to a more competitive approach. Elite consensus on the threat is a 1st step to correct "under balancing" but will also require consensus on remedies, resources & cohesion to pay high costs. 2/
Consequently, the crisis is an *opportunity* because econ stressed India is likely to lean more on partners, eg US. But the crisis also exposed or exacerbated three features of Indian strategy that challenge the US vision of it playing a “pre-eminent role” in the Indo-Pacific. 3/
The crisis revealed:
1) deficiencies in India's NatSec software & strategic assessment (intel process, crisis signaling, policy choices);
2) India's sensitivity/concentration on continental borders (trading off with its maritime capabilities);
3) India's dependence on Russia 4/
1) deficiencies in India's NatSec software & strategic assessment (intel process, crisis signaling, policy choices);
2) India's sensitivity/concentration on continental borders (trading off with its maritime capabilities);
3) India's dependence on Russia 4/
First, US needs to take stock of these structural or path-dependent features and account for how they challenge the US vision for India in the Indo-Pacific. Second, the US can’t “fix” these challenges but it can improve/adjust some aspects of relationship to mitigate them. 5/
Offers could involve:
1) C4ISR collaboration, exchange of technical intel+big picture assessments;
2) security assistance for
maritime capability via excess defense articles & FMF;
3) interoperability workarounds to
hardware that'll never go away https://twitter.com/splalwani/status/1281205471156764674?s=20 6/
1) C4ISR collaboration, exchange of technical intel+big picture assessments;
2) security assistance for
maritime capability via excess defense articles & FMF;3) interoperability workarounds to
hardware that'll never go away https://twitter.com/splalwani/status/1281205471156764674?s=20 6/
But reciprocity key so US asks could involve more instl. intel relations; diplo support for US presence at Diego Garcia; & visible operationalization of defense ties w/ complex jt. exercises/ops/basing for “signals of strength” to enhance deterrence ( https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626724) 7/
These are just some thoughts I've been mulling but feedback welsome. There's more to learn from this crisis as it unfolds and details emerge. The problems aren't new, but if the urgency is more acute, there may be scope for some creative workarounds to known challenges. /END
PS -- Thanks to @avasudeva_87, @clary_co, @ushasahay, @shaneamason, @EvansRyan202, and twitterless Yun Sun, Michael Krepon, and Harry Hannah for helping me work through my arguments.
