The negotiation box by @eucopresident does two tweaks to the RRF: It changes the allocation key to take into account actual GDP loss and it increases the role of the Council. Both go in the wrong direction.

Short overview:

1/ On allocation: Only 70%, i.e. 217 billion, will be allocated according to the key proposed by @EU_Commission and should be committed in 2021 and 2022. The rest (93 bn) will be distributed in 2022 according to the cumulative GDP shortfall instead of past unemployment.

2/ This responds to the critics who have argued that the current key does not factor in actual economic damage due to the pandemic. But many also argued that speed is of the essence for macro impact. Yet, instead of speeding up the process, this new rule cements slow spending.

3/ Almost 1/3 of the funds could only be *committed* in 2023. That means that actual payments would even come later. And until summer 2022, no country would have certainty about their final RRF allocation - but certainty is what they need most if they are to start spending soon.

4/ Thus, the price for factoring in actual GDP losses predictably would be a slowing down of the process - this is why the original COM proposal on allocation was not as stupid as people made it out to be.

5/ On governance, @eucopresident just copy-pastes the presidency proposal that would strengthen the role of the Council in approving national plans and would also give a role to state secretaries opining on how countries have implemented their plans. No mention of the EP.

6/ I've explained yesterday why I don't find that a particularly clever idea. If approved like this, it would be up to @Europarl_EN to insert itself into the process. This should be one of their negotiation priorities. https://twitter.com/lucasguttenberg/status/1281144765116035072?s=20