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@MiraRappHooper raises an important point about the link b/w alliances and trade.
Turns out, this is a topic on which International Relations scholarship has quite a bit to say.
[THREAD] https://twitter.com/MiraRappHooper/status/1280861894019108865
Turns out, this is a topic on which International Relations scholarship has quite a bit to say.
[THREAD] https://twitter.com/MiraRappHooper/status/1280861894019108865
I summarized much of the broader literature on the trade-alliance link in an earlier thread https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1217833739415425025
But I want to focus on the direct point raised above: that strong alliances can reinforce trade ties.
To do that, I want to unpack one of my favorite papers: this 2010 @JPR_journal piece by @PSBenFordham https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343310381689
To do that, I want to unpack one of my favorite papers: this 2010 @JPR_journal piece by @PSBenFordham https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343310381689
Fordham's starting point is the idea of "asymmetric alliances". What's that? It's well captured in a phrase from Waltz's "Theory of International Politics" https://www.google.com/books/edition/Theory_of_International_Politics/OaMfAAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Theory+of+International+Politics&printsec=frontcover
On page 169, Waltz writes
More generally, an asymmetric alliance is when a major power is allied with a non-major power (or a bunch of minor powers)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499?casa_token=PGBzVrv528sAAAAA%3A8BwprQbC6rH3xCZcD8ZH_kxGTeaf9VpTh2EVhUq1YZVIdlMMMRaVIrh3EDq-qYeEqQa3LmDVpPVvWmjzSPd4uVfTpwPh7kh9WB18UF0PlBwWf1Z4-Q&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499?casa_token=PGBzVrv528sAAAAA%3A8BwprQbC6rH3xCZcD8ZH_kxGTeaf9VpTh2EVhUq1YZVIdlMMMRaVIrh3EDq-qYeEqQa3LmDVpPVvWmjzSPd4uVfTpwPh7kh9WB18UF0PlBwWf1Z4-Q&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Why does this matter for trade? Well, it could be a key reason that the major power views such alliances as in its interest. As Fordham writes
The logic is that the alliance enables the major power to prevent interference by a third party. The third party could "interfere" in a few ways
First, a third party might use coercion to force a state to shift its trade/production patterns.
Think of states being "brought into" the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War (e.g. The Prague Coup)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Czechoslovak_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
Think of states being "brought into" the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War (e.g. The Prague Coup)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Czechoslovak_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
Second, a third party might use force to simply take over a trade partner.
Think of Saddam Hussein's Iraq invading Kuwait in 1991
Think of Saddam Hussein's Iraq invading Kuwait in 1991
Third, alliances are a tool of conflict management: they can be used by the major power to prevent conflict BETWEEN alliance members.
Alliances as instruments of conflict management has been explored by Patricia Weitsman... https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=sdNYUKqpl2gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP15&dq=Patricia+Weitsman,+dangerous+alliances&ots=1KkmQEWr0X&sig=RqYclwxAjzbM9kT2XE523ZC1Py8#v=onepage&q&f=false
Alliances as instruments of conflict management has been explored by Patricia Weitsman... https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=sdNYUKqpl2gC&oi=fnd&pg=PP15&dq=Patricia+Weitsman,+dangerous+alliances&ots=1KkmQEWr0X&sig=RqYclwxAjzbM9kT2XE523ZC1Py8#v=onepage&q&f=false
and @djpressman https://www.google.com/books/edition/Warring_Friends/o3MOQIsGsGcC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Jeremy+Pressman,+alliances&printsec=frontcover
Kathy Powers in @JPR_journal most directly explored how alliance obligations can bring about the stability necessary for trade to thrive https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022343306065882?casa_token=fpGqcfxrqG4AAAAA:qqTbdGLsA2OwL5CoFVNVPBsj-rj9gjwrTI6W6bB6cwkxM7x_3yU4-eYjY54UMRhxCxRn7rPeW2s
Given these reasons to think that alliances bolster trade, how does Fordham evaluate the claim?
He needs data on three variables:
- Major powers v minor powers
- alliance commitments
- trade flows
He needs data on three variables:
- Major powers v minor powers
- alliance commitments
- trade flows
To identify major powers/minor powers, Fordham relies on the identification offered by the Correlates of War Project ( https://correlatesofwar.org/ ). That leads him to produce the following table.
To code alliance commitments, Fordham draws on the alliance treaty obligations and provisions (ATOP) data produced by @BAshleyLeeds, @sbmitche, Jeffrey M Ritter, & Andrew Long
http://www.atopdata.org/
http://www.atopdata.org/
To capture trade flows, one source of trade data used by Fordham is the BKP trade data described here:
http://data.nber.org/ens/feldstein/Harvard%20Library%20Sources/Correlates%20of%20War/Bilateral%20Trade/Trade_Codebook_3.0.pdf
http://data.nber.org/ens/feldstein/Harvard%20Library%20Sources/Correlates%20of%20War/Bilateral%20Trade/Trade_Codebook_3.0.pdf
Having collected these data, Fordham relies on the standard state-to-state "dyad" unit of analysis (e.g. US-Poland 1962) to organize the data (where state A in the dyad is a major power and state B is a non-major power)
He then estimates a probit model with bilateral trade flows as the key explanatory and whether states A and B form an alliance as the outcome variable
What does Fordham find? Well, you could look at the regression table "eye-chart"
But Fordham translates these results into substantive effects. Specifically, he finds that, on average, increasing the trade flows between two countries by 1/2 a standard deviation will increase the probability of alliance formation by 50%.
That's a lot!
That's a lot!
In a sense, Fordham's paper adds large-N statistical backing to claims found in the "Wisconsin School" of diplomatic history: US foreign policy is largely driven by the need to obtain and protect trade markets https://www.google.com/books/edition/The_Tragedy_of_American_Diplomacy/ZUS7t8Af-i4C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=William+Appleman+Williams&printsec=frontcover
In sum, there is indeed good evidence underpinning @MiraRappHooper's claim: a key benefit to alliance relations is protection of trade routes.
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