An important structuring factor of the Eurozone is that south-north transfers through regulation are much less visible than north-south transfers through redistribution.

The euro wiped out southern exports and low interest rates boosted demand for northern products in the south. Tax rules allow southern companies to transfer profits to Luxembourg or the Netherlands. But these transfers are mostly invisible to the public.

In contrast, direct transfers through the rescue package are highly politicised and visible, and much more difficult to implement politically, especially by Northern politicians who don't want to tell complex and uncomfortable stories to their voters.

Same principle applies within countries. People made fun of Ed Milliband a few years back for his "predistribution" agenda but it is true that *ex ante* resource allocation through regulation is easier politically than *ex post* redistribution https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-19503451

If the Netherlands had its own currency there would be more demand for it and it would appreciate, making exports more expensive. In the 1970s demand for Dutch natural gas inflated the value of the guilder and made all other exports uncompetitive (the "Dutch disease").

Within the Euro, because the Netherlands shares a currency with weaker economies with low productivity, its currency is structurally undervalued, boosting its export competitiveness. For the the South, the currency is systematically overvalued, hampering it.