On a wide spectrum of the big issues in play vis-a-vis China policy, the EU’s involvement is critical. The major strategic economic and technology matters - from supply chains to data flows to connectivity to taking on Chinese subsidies - are not going to be solved by the 5 Eyes.

The US, Japan et al are ever-more aware of this, hence the proliferation of new dialogues. And the areas where the EU matters most are also the issues where its position is likely to be most robust, stronger even in certain areas than the US (see the new antitrust instruments) 9/

Brexit politics does result in some hang-ups on the UK side about figuring out how to align on this agenda - watch the last Commons debate about Huawei/5G for a representative sample. You could easily emerge without knowing that the actual alternatives are European companies. 10/

Ironically, many facets of the UK’s new approach to China (“Project Defend” etc.) are precisely what it used to fight against in the EU. The UK is not alone - the mindset shift from other European free-traders has been quite stark - but it is certainly not in the vanguard... 11/

I do think the UK is going to be a source of creative energy on figuring out the new democratic coalition building that will be required on China. But that was always possible. The obstacle to it was the “Golden Era” and its tortured aftermath, not the EU. 12/12