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I rather disagree with this framing. It starts with an assumption that China initiated the rising tensions on the LAC and then proceeds to debate the options. But we don't actually know whether that assumption is correct. You shouldn't go to war on a possibly faulty assumption > https://twitter.com/dhume/status/1278748808436998146
Some questions: 1) What did China think about last year’s bifurcation of J&K? I’ve yet to read a convincing explanation for the bifurcation – which weakened India’s overall claim to the integrity of J&K - other than to build up Ladakh for use as a base against China.
That might be wrong, but you can hardly be surprised if it made Beijing suspicious. An earlier BJP govt was ready to offer the US the use of Indian bases after 9/11. What was the current government ready to offer the US against China? I don't know by the way. It's a question.
2) What happened in last month's clash in Galwan? I’ve read all the Indian media reports, but I haven’t seen a serious reconstruction from the Chinese side (like many people, I can’t read Chinese, but that to me is a reason for caution as I’m aware I’m missing half the story).
3) Where would the legitimate claim line be if the border were to be put to international arbitration? What principles of topography would it follow? I'm struggling to see how you can make a serious topographical claim for India keeping a small part of the Galwan valley >
The LAC is a mess for historical reasons. The best we have are references from previous India-China negotiations:
https://mobile.twitter.com/NMenonRao/status/1277321196040622080.
https://mobile.twitter.com/NMenonRao/status/1277321196040622080.
4) How do we compare the threat perceptions of India & China? I know India dislikes the Maxwell book on the 1962 war, but I note he says “The Galwan valley appeared on (Indian) Army H.Q.’s maps as one of the best routes along which troops could move into Chinese-held territory.”
They were wrong by the way - going into Galwan was a bad idea in the run-up to the 1962 war for which Indian troops paid a heavy price (they were wiped out). But the Indian generals being wrong does not change the Chinese threat perception.
5) Until recently, India did not build roads right up to the “frontier” – it’s asking for trouble as in doing so, you also build invasion routes in. China’s initial road-building in the Aksai Chin had nothing to do with India – it was all about connecting Xinjiang with Tibet.
6) Should India have left well enough alone? The terrain there is savage enough to deter invading armies. But you’re poking at a hornet’s nest if you appear to threaten China on Xinjiang & Tibet. (reminder, the issue here is not right vs wrong but threat perception).
7) Big step back – people are saying the Daulet Beg Oldi road is of vital strategic importance. Less than 20 years ago, it was a dirt track. What changed? For most of independent India’s life it was not strategic enough to develop, and now India will go to war over it?
8) I see people saying the road must be defended to protect India’s position in Siachen. This is a sunk costs fallacy. India shouldn’t have gone into Siachen in the first place (neither should Pakistan). Reminder, nobody lives there – the fighting is over uninhabitable terrain.
9) To wrap up, I’m aware that every one of my points above can be challenged. Fair enough. But if you are going to debate options for war, you really do need to start by questioning the underlying assumptions that got India and China to this point. Don’t take them for granted.
