New UK Coronavirus analysis. A thread.
Public Health England has today released the second tranche of data for COVID tests. This is the most comprehensive data we have for tests as it includes Pillar 1 tests (conducted by PHE and NHS hospitals) and Pillar 2 tests (conducted by private companies under NHS Test &Trace).
Some journalists have been using data from http://coronavirus.data.gov  – but this is dangerously misleading as it only reveals Pillar 1 tests – which are now around a releatively small proportion of tests. This has led to erroneous league tables based on Pillar 1 data only.
We want to be able to identify possible regions that have the potential to have remedial action taken, for example local ‘lockdowns’, in the future.
This does not mean that these areas will be locked down, more that they should be investigated by Directors of Public Health and local journalists. Without specific local knowledge, here are the criteria I have used to identify regions of interest:
Here is my analysis of today's data release. http://www.duncanrobertson.com/2020/07/01/which-city-could-be-next-for-a-leicester-like-lockdown/ . Feel free to share with attribution
And here is the accompanying data table. Feel free to share with attribution. More at http://www.duncanrobertson.com/2020/07/01/which-city-could-be-next-for-a-leicester-like-lockdown/
A more general point needs to be made about the paucity of publicly available data. Without timely, complete, accurate data available to the public, there are several issues:
1 Towns such as Leicester may not understand why they are being locked down, as the maps at the Coronavirus data service do not show anything particularly unusual about Leicester;
2 Other towns may see that they have relatively high case levels on the Coronavirus data service, causing unnecessary alarm;
3 Having data at a coarse geographical area (currently Upper Tier Local Authorities) does not allow outbreaks in towns and villages to be identified;
Unitary authorities (such as Leicester) are separated on the maps,cities such as Oxford (where there is a city council and a separate county council) are included in the data for Oxfordshire, where urban and rural data is evened out, hiding outbreaks in cities.
There are several caveats that need to be emphasized:
1 The number of tests carried out: when there are low number of tests, there are necessarily low numbers of detected cases. We do not currently have information for the number of tests carried out in each region
2 More local testing in locations with known cases: As local outbreaks are detected, extra testing resources may be allocated to towns such as Leicester, with mobile testing stations being set up. There is a feedback loop here meaning that extra cases will be detected
3 There is a time lag before this data becomes available: The latest data (published today, 2 July 2020) is for cases detected up to 28 June 2020 – so is not in real-time. In addition, there is a further delay between individuals becoming infected and a case being detected.
4 Outbreaks in care homes, hospitals and prisons: These need to be treated independently, and are currently included in the data. We know that there are outbreaks in these locations, and PHE report on these (but we don’t know where these outbreaks are taking place).
5 Local Directors of Public Health are the experts in their local areas: These professionals are experts, know their communities well, and understand the dynamics of transmission far more than can be ascertained by looking at figures in a database.
There have been delays in getting this data to local authorities and issues with data quality, but the Prime Minister has promised in the House of Commons that the data is now getting through.
The delay and lack of detail of Pillar 2 results at district council level, or within-local authority breakdowns (as is disclosed for Pillar 1 tests) highlights data weaknesses, compounding the delays in convening the Joint Biosecurity Centre, and the failure ...
... of the centralised NHS Test and Trace App. While directors of public health, Public Health England, NHS Test and Trace, the Joint Biosecurity Centre, and the Department of Health and Social care all play their part,
The policy for controlling a pandemic rests with central Government and is ultimately the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Authority can be delegated but responsibility can not.
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