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Just out in @chinaquarterly: my @citizenlab colleagues and I examine the relationship between political events and info control on WeChat thru a longitudinal analysis of keyword censorship related to China's 19th National Communist Party Congress (NCPC19) https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/intermingling-of-state-and-private-companies-analysing-censorship-of-the-19th-national-communist-party-congress-on-wechat/9D63E906590D2E388C29DCED5D7E62FE
China's censorship regime is often described as a top-down system where the state powerfully follows certain uniform 'logic' to enforce censorship decisions. Here we want to study exactly what roles the government and private companies play in information control in China.
We use a novel method to track censorship on WeChat before, during and after the NCPC19.
Not surprisingly, the system of information control in China can trigger blunt reactions to political events. Keyword censorship on WeChat increased as the Congress approached; as the event faded away.
What's interesting is that in addition to critical content around the Congress and Party leaders, WeChat also censored neutral and potentially positive references to government policies and ideological concepts. (not a mere dichotomy between collective action and govt criticism)
Censorship did loosen up as the event faded away. However, content referencing Chinese President Xi Jinping remained the top blocked categories even a year after the NCPCP19. Content remained blocked were predominantly critical in nature.
So what do these findings mean? W/o insights into China's censorship black box, it is diff to pinpoint who make what decisions and why. (On this, I highly recommend @MaryGao & @bapmiller's work analyzing interactions between company & state censors through leaked log data.)
But we can still offer our take on the censorship patterns we observed.
Overall, our case study shows that the system of online control is effective in compelling companies to implement information controls.
Overall, our case study shows that the system of online control is effective in compelling companies to implement information controls.
Blocking criticism of government and leaders could be a means to prevent the spread of messaging that is potentially destabilizing to the Party during a critical moment. This observation has been discussed thoroughly by @ashleyesarey, @rockngo etc.
Following Sebastian Heilmann's analysis of China's politics, censoring speculation and rumours concerning leaders and power struggles within the Party may be motivated by an effort to project images of power and unity and help leaders to save face or avoid embarrassment.
Prohibiting discussions of symbols of criticism and resistance may be a continuation of the CCP’s guideline on manufacturing consent by nudging the public to“think positive” (citing @Anne_MarieBrady's book Marketing Dictatorship) rather than question the Party’s legitimacy.
Again what's less discussed is the blocking of neutral/positive content. A number of keyword combinations censored on WeChat were extracted from Xinhua News Agency, a news source that CCP had instructed media to use as the standard for NCPC19 coverage.
It is unclear whether the decision to block neutral content came from WeChat, the state or a combination of both. e.g., Was it WeChat that self-censored to avoid official reprimands? Was it part of a govt strategy to control discussions of NCPC19 even in semi-private venues?
Either way this observation points to nuances that have not been captured or fully explained in existing theories, which are largely based on the assumption that China’s censorship is the precise outcome of government strategies.
Instead, censorship decisions made regarding NCPC19-related content show a relationship between private companies and the state that goes beyond the companies passively implementing orders (hence "the Intermingling of state and private companies").
We end the paper by calling for a deeper understanding of the role of private companies in censorship and a more nuanced assessment of the government's capacity to control social media.
BTW we've made the paper open access so feel free to share, comment, and critique https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/intermingling-of-state-and-private-companies-analysing-censorship-of-the-19th-national-communist-party-congress-on-wechat/9D63E906590D2E388C29DCED5D7E62FE
