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The CIA recently released papers pertaining to the Indo Chinese 1962 war. These papers have been declassified and make for an interesting read. Thread to follow.
PM Nehru initially thought economic strengthening could act as a bulwark against Chinese intentions. In the fall of 1959 he was also toying with the idea of exchanging Aksai Chin in return for Chinese acceptance of Indian suzerainty in NEFA.
India did not accept UN's attempts to block China over Tibet on the back of Zhou Elai's assurance to Nehru that Chinese forces would not enter Lhasa. Zhou was banking on Nehru's anti imperialist attitude and his sincere efforts at Sino China relations. He was proven wrong.
By 1959, things began to change. Apart from sheltering The Dalai Lama Nehru refused to meet Chinese ambassador. The Chinese too wanted to deal with the Indian border later and rather wanted India to stop supporting Tibetan rebels. They even did not object to caricatures of Mao.
And then on 18 April 1959, the first cracks began to appear. Dalai Lama issued a statement in Tezpur, Assam stating that he was not under duress in India. Although MEA had toned it down, for Peking it was the last straw. The Anti India pushback was out in the open now.
25-26 August 1959 the first major Indo-China armed conflict began to appear. PM Nehru continued to maintain in the Parliament that he thought the Chinese had not crossed into Indian borders. He however began to face a backlash in home something the Chinese had not anticipated.
10 September 1959 began to see a public change of Nehru's position. He now stated that he no longer thought India and China spoke the same language. Further he clarified that India will not submit to 'bullying'. He made an even more blistering attack on 13 September.
In the same month Nehru wrote to Zhou using phrases like 'I disagree with your view' etc signalling that the personal bonhomie between the two leaders was finally over. The Chinese too now believed Nehru was a 'two faced' nationalist who was not neutral in true sense.
Fact, when General Thimmaya had opined that the Chinese were a threat, Defense Minister Menon had shot him down. Pakistan was the foremost enemy,a position perhaps agreed by Nehru. The Kashmir dispute seems to have had enraged Nehru more than the Sino Indian dispute.
General Thimmaya opined that ridge line of the Karokoram Range was the only defensible part of the Aksai Chin region. Nehru too began to prepare the public about possible loss of Aksai Chin to the Chinese, the events since early 1959 had began to signal the same.
Nehru had misread the public mood however. Egged by former General Cariappa on 4th November thousands of Indian students protested in front of the Chinese embassy in Delhi as part of the "Throwback the Aggressors Day". Nehru now began to change his line of thought on Aksai Chin.
On 4th November a revised note was sent to the Chinese by Nehru which stated clearl that Aksai Chin was infact Indian territory and India would not compromise on the same. Nehru's original reply was not liked by Prez Rajendra Prasad for it 'lacked firmness' in his opinion.
In October 1959, the leader of a Indian police party, captured during a clash, was coerced to 'confess' violence in border was as a result of Indian actions. When this knowledge became public the mood against China became very palpable. Zhou began to press Nehru for talks.
As Zhou put pressure for talks between October 59 and Jan 60 Nehru put two preconditions:
1. China must go back from Longju which it had illegally conquered.
2. Both armies will move back from disputed sectors in Ladakh
1. China must go back from Longju which it had illegally conquered.
2. Both armies will move back from disputed sectors in Ladakh
Zhou countered :
1. Aksai Chin was never contiguous with Indian borders, India didn't even realize China was building a road for a full year.
2. Zhou hinted that Peking would be willing to exchange its claim to the area south of the McMahon line for New Delhi's claim to the Aksai
1. Aksai Chin was never contiguous with Indian borders, India didn't even realize China was building a road for a full year.
2. Zhou hinted that Peking would be willing to exchange its claim to the area south of the McMahon line for New Delhi's claim to the Aksai
Nehru was unwilling to trust the Chinese anymore until January 1960 when he was advised by his ambassadors and certain Cabinet Ministers to drop his preconditions which he finally did. Nehru finally wrote back to Chou in February 1960 agreeing to meet Chou.
What came next however, surprised the Indians, Zhou was planning a six day trip to Delhi signalling that they wished a 'permanent settlement'.When Zhou finally did come in April 1960 he was stonewalled by everyone and it was clear to the Chinese that India would not back down.
1961 China still believed New Delhi would negotiate. Even Chairman Mao believed in a soft approach to India. China believed there was space to negotiate when infact there was none. Publicly however the Peking Radio was able to present its case far more voraciously than AIR.
China now tried to placate Nehru thorough the Communist Party of India. Both Ghosh and Dange regularly met the Chinese but under immense public pressure on November 59 had brought out a statement criticizing Chinese position in the border.
At this point another significant event being played out was Sino Burma tensions. The new Burmese premier Ba Swe was in no mood to relent to the Chinese and faced with intense pressure and a possible fallout with India, China withdrew troops from Burmese area it had acquired.
Meanwhile China still hoped that the Sino Indian conflict was temporal and in a letter dated 26.2.61, Zhou hoped that differences would be reconciled. Meanwhile Sino Nepal and Sino Burmese agreements were also signed within this short span of time to resolves the border issues.
January 1961, the Chinese strategy remained:
to work for a rapprochement with New Delhi, to consider
India as still nonaligned, and to avoid personal attacks
on Nehru. In order to achieve this the borders were quietened down.China was insistent on avoiding an open confrontation.
to work for a rapprochement with New Delhi, to consider
India as still nonaligned, and to avoid personal attacks
on Nehru. In order to achieve this the borders were quietened down.China was insistent on avoiding an open confrontation.
Till June 1961 China continued to press Nehru privately and publicly to convince him of their desire of a settlement. They publicly acknowledged an exchange between Aksai Chin and NEFA could be on cards and cited Sino Burma and Sino Nepal treaties as examples of their commitment.
On 26 Feb 1962, a Chinese diplomat in Delhi privately commented that Nehru's sending forces to Congo showed he was 'pro USA'. Further he stated that Nehru would drag out the border issue to win the 1960 elections.
After July 1961, the formal disenchantment of China began they now saw no hope. Nehru began to be publicly chided a departure from a long drawn Chinese tactic.
On 12 August 1961, China released its first protest note condemning:
1. Air reconnaissance over Chinese territories
2. Indian troops push to Demchong area,Charding La and Thanga Pass.
3. Setting up of checkpost in Oga
4. Establishment of Indian personal in Bara Hoti (Wuju)
1. Air reconnaissance over Chinese territories
2. Indian troops push to Demchong area,Charding La and Thanga Pass.
3. Setting up of checkpost in Oga
4. Establishment of Indian personal in Bara Hoti (Wuju)
Indian response:
The MEA do not see why the Government of China should have any concern with measures India adopts inside her territory. As regards to patrolling Kargo is well within India and Charding La is on traditional border and Indian control.
The MEA do not see why the Government of China should have any concern with measures India adopts inside her territory. As regards to patrolling Kargo is well within India and Charding La is on traditional border and Indian control.
MEA officials however were not clear with facts on the grounds evident from Nehru's speeches in the Parliament. In one instance an American official had to point out a mistake made in the MEA note privately. The note was quietly rectified.
Nehru's public remarks and clamor in Parliament made the the Chinese leaders were convinced that Nehru had decided to intensify India's military plan to recover territory in the western sector. They tried to deter him. Threats were consistently being issued by the Chinese now.
In February, Chinese embassy officials in New Delhi informed leftist journalists of a "formula'' which included joint use of Aksai Chin road,formation of a joint commission to demarcate the Ladakh border, and recognition of China of the McMahon Line.
Nehru expressed three conditions for negotiation:
1.China must agree to vacate border posts in India
2.Admit that the Aksai Plain road traverses Indian territory in Ladakh and agree to 'construct an alternate route,
3.Publish full text of the border committee report
1.China must agree to vacate border posts in India
2.Admit that the Aksai Plain road traverses Indian territory in Ladakh and agree to 'construct an alternate route,
3.Publish full text of the border committee report
In Geneva Chinese were further willing to compromise, apart from giving up demands for NEFA they were willing to give up further demands of Ladakh barring Aksai Chin. However the Chinese refused to move troops from places they held ground! This was not acceptable to India.
Stung by criticism on home and abroad Nehru now embarked on a bolder Army strategy. It called for the establishment of five new Indian posts of 80-100 men
each behind nine existing forward Chinese posts in Ladakh on the 1956 claim line; the posts manned all-year round.
each behind nine existing forward Chinese posts in Ladakh on the 1956 claim line; the posts manned all-year round.
Krishna Menon instructed the Indian air force to prepare
a report on its capability to sustain a major air
supply effort. The idea was to cut off the Chinese posts
a report on its capability to sustain a major air
supply effort. The idea was to cut off the Chinese posts
The Americans confirmed that on 29.04.62 two battalions of Indian Army were ordered to move forward. The goal was to take over the Chinese posts as soon as possible. The Chinese retaliated by increased patrolling . Nehru publicly came out claiming that India would take on China
The Chinese now came out all guns blazing. Menon admitted in a meeting that India was not equipped to sustain aggressive positions in Ladakh and that talks had to be the way forward. Parliament too realizing the failure of ' military action' egged for talks.
At this point however Indian and Chinese forces took on each other at Thagla Ridge. Subsequently a new corps was quickly established by India in Tezpur,Assam. The war had now truly began!
When war broke out on October 1962,as per US the Chinese had not expected India to fold up so quickly but it did. However the attempts by India to seek help from USA and USSR alerted the Chinese to a possibility that USA might hedge a role in Asia.
China declared a unilateral ceasefire soon and began working to ease pressure on Nehru. However there was nothing left to preserve now. The Chou-Nehru relationship was dead, Mao's struggle and unity formula had become all struggle now.
