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After some recent 'discussion' on the 'merits' of the Boulton Paul Defiant, my attention was drawn to this new book, which claimed to establish the 'surprising truth' about this 'forgotten fighter'. Having now read the book, I have 'several' observations to make...
Disclaimer: I consider the Defiant was designed for the war that never happened, was outclassed as a day fighter, & had the same drawbacks as other radarless night fighters. My views are based on 10 years of primary research on the Battle of Britain (MA) & night air defence (PhD)
This research has led me to rather different conclusions, but I have always liked the look of the aircraft - I recently built it in 1:48th scale - but looks are no guarantee of a successful war weapon, or vice versa (the A10, for instance?)
I was therefore interested to see what compelling arguments for the Defiant would be presented. Unfortunately, such arguments will have to wait for a future book, as Verkaik's contribution is littered with inaccuracies & contradictions.
It is a product of superficial research & mistaken assumptions leading to faulty conclusions. Many of these misconceptions can be traced to the author not being a historian. This is not to say that non-historians cannot write outstanding history - Stephen Bungay is one example.
Verkaik has failed to conduct a systematic survey of the subject matter, leading to the mistakes, assumptions & contradictions throughout the book. The author does not seem to be able decide what the book is about. The experiences of his uncle flying FE2Ds in FWW feature early on
He tries unsuccessfully to relate this to the Defiant. He seems obsessed with where aircrew were educated, possibly a legacy from his book on public schools. The expansion of the RAF in the 1930s is covered in a peculiar way - he is convinced that all RAF fighters were 2 seaters
This includes the Armstrong Whitworth Siskin, which suggests that the author's understanding of air power & the history of aviation is flawed.
A selection of these inaccuracies will lend context to the author's assertions about the Defiant. He describes the Be2C as a 'fighter', & that the RFC flew 'missions'. He describes a 'Somme campaign' in 1915, which can only be the Battle of Loos - which was north of Arras.
His description of the Sopwith Camel as the 'first truly British designed & manufactured fighter' would have been a surprise to its designer, Herbert Smith, who had also designed its predecessors, the Triplane & Pup, as well as Geoffrey De Havilland, who designed the DH2.
Hopefully these examples illustrate the point, but more worrying is the author's complete lack of understanding about the principles of combat, aircraft design, development, service evaluation and establishment of tactical doctrine.
As Seb Ritchie has demonstrated, the pace of technological change increased rapidly in the 1930s, so when the 1st generation monoplane fighters entered service in 1938 it took an extended period of time before Fighter Command worked out how they should be used.
The Defiant 'turret fighter' was intended for use against unescorted enemy bombers, so there was little time to revise tactics after the fall of France brought Luftwaffe fighters into range.
Dowding is accused of expecting 8 gun fighters to perform better than the Defiant, but since there was no operational information before April 1940, this should not be a surprise. Despite this, a conference to agree operational deployment of the Defiant was held in May 1940.
Verkaik accepts the concept of combat overclaiming, but insists that Defiant crews were 'honest & accurate' in their victory claims, although does not explain how they achieved this while others did not.
Once the book reaches Dunkirk, the narrative becomes further detached from reality. The events of 29 May are used to establish the effectiveness of the aircraft, with 38 victories claimed, but no attempt is made to resolve this number to the 14 Luftwaffe aircraft actually lost.
Such figures are glibly repeated on subsequent pages, without providing any historical evidence for them. Keith Park is criticised for expressing reservations about this 'success', & for recommending that the aircraft should always operate with single-seat fighter escort.
Verkaik complains that Defiant losses in the Battle of Britain were due to lack of escort & based too far forward, & Dowding/Park 'should' have prevented this. He fails to understand the RAF Command & Control system, & that tactical doctrine is not dictated by a single squadron
The First World War demonstrated the huge changes in warfare, & how armies had to adapt & change. This process took years, but in the Battle of Britain the protagonists had to adapt & change tactics within days, which overtook the needs of a maximum of 2 Defiant squadrons.
Verkaik accuses Park of having 'a closed mind', but this was open enough to change tactics & pair Spitfire & Hurricane squadrons later in the battle, & to go on to successfully direct the air battle over Malta.
He claims the Defiant shot down 'more enemy aircraft than other RAF aircraft' & quotes 102 German aircraft destroyed, before quietly revising this to 'no more than 23' 20 pages later. Later operational history is dismissed by saying the Defiant was 'ready-made' as a night fighter
The final paragraph claims that the concept of the 2-seat fighter survived the Battle of Britain because the Tornado & F14 were 2 of the most successful fighters of the 20th century. there is so much wrong with that statement that demonstrates how flawed the rest of the book is.
Presumably, he has never heard of the Beaufighter, Mosquito, Bf 110 or Me 410. In conclusion, just in case you haven't picked up on it, I wasn't impressed. I am open to my opinions on the Defiant being challenged, but this is not the book that is going to do it.
