Read on Twitter
Whether he is right or not, PM Oli’s remarks reflect:
1) his internal weakness, concern
2) total breakdown in ties with India
Situation with Nepal is looking increasingly similar to the India-Maldives crisis with Yameen in 2018. We know how that ended... https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/india-conspiring-to-topple-me-from-power-pm-oli/
1) his internal weakness, concern
2) total breakdown in ties with India
Situation with Nepal is looking increasingly similar to the India-Maldives crisis with Yameen in 2018. We know how that ended... https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/india-conspiring-to-topple-me-from-power-pm-oli/
Thread ahead... 2
“Delhi may now be less confident in PM Oli. This does not mean India will interfere to support any political alternative... (but) India may now see Oli as more of a problem, rather than part of the solution to improve bilateral relations” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/11/interpreting-the-india-nepal-border-dispute/
“Delhi may now be less confident in PM Oli. This does not mean India will interfere to support any political alternative... (but) India may now see Oli as more of a problem, rather than part of the solution to improve bilateral relations” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/11/interpreting-the-india-nepal-border-dispute/
3 Who is to blame for this crisis is another (shared) matter, as I’ve written in the piece above.
But here’s one factual pattern in history: leaders in Nepal that openly attack India and lose Delhi’s trust, don’t last long in power. https://thewire.in/diplomacy/nepal-india-relations-china
But here’s one factual pattern in history: leaders in Nepal that openly attack India and lose Delhi’s trust, don’t last long in power. https://thewire.in/diplomacy/nepal-india-relations-china
4 In early 2018, when Yameen did sth similar, many Indian analysts were calling for a military invasion of the Maldives or other hawkish action. I argued against... there are different, cheaper and more effective tools India can use in such situations. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-must-play-hardball-if-it-wants-to-be-part-of-the-maldives-return-to-stability/story-sDLbd8jxsnlCqgfbqcyd4I.html
5 When Yameen was ousted in free elections later that year, we saw the new Maldivian leaders thank Delhi and proclaim an “India first” policy. Many in India were satisfied, calling it a great victory...
I then cautioned against simplistic, complacent readings in a complex region https://twitter.com/constantinox/status/1044609849084919808
I then cautioned against simplistic, complacent readings in a complex region https://twitter.com/constantinox/status/1044609849084919808
6 Later that year, the Sri Lanka constitutional crisis erupted and again some Indian analysts were calling for interference to protect Wickremesinghe to keep “pro-China” Rajapaksas out.
Through background channels, India worked to defuse the crisis. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/new-delhi-can-t-hope-to-do-a-male-in-colombo/story-EoYKpms3TZIe6VMzvhJKzL.html
Through background channels, India worked to defuse the crisis. https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/new-delhi-can-t-hope-to-do-a-male-in-colombo/story-EoYKpms3TZIe6VMzvhJKzL.html
7 The Maldives and Sri Lanka crisis of 2018 may well have been a turning point in India’s approach, as I argued:
“it is only a question of time before the new “pro-India” leadership cozies up again to China.”
(Same for Sri Lanka, recent weeks show that) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-12-20/new-indian-realpolitik
“it is only a question of time before the new “pro-India” leadership cozies up again to China.”
(Same for Sri Lanka, recent weeks show that) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-12-20/new-indian-realpolitik
8 With China’s greater stakes in all these countries, as well as constant political instability, Delhi is thus learning that there are limits to these political games.
“India can no longer afford to have permanent friends, but only permanent interests.” https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/up-front/story/20200629-countering-china-in-nepal-and-the-neighbourhood-1691184-2020-06-21
“India can no longer afford to have permanent friends, but only permanent interests.” https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/up-front/story/20200629-countering-china-in-nepal-and-the-neighbourhood-1691184-2020-06-21
9 And thus my repeated arguments, in the case of Nepal, that there are decreasing returns for Delhi to invest in political micromanagement.
In fact, I wrote this in 2018 when Delhi wasn’t too happy to see that PM Oli was likely to return to power. https://theprint.in/opinion/india-nepal-resist-temptation-to-micromanage/19847/
In fact, I wrote this in 2018 when Delhi wasn’t too happy to see that PM Oli was likely to return to power. https://theprint.in/opinion/india-nepal-resist-temptation-to-micromanage/19847/
10 Also, this “India can topple at will” narrative is rather simplistic. Anyone who knows Kathmandu’s politics, is well aware that conspiracy theories and attempts to involve India abound. Opposition forces often spread rumors, try to get Delhi to interfere, signal support etc.
11 Politics and leadership in Nepal / neighboring countries DO affect Indian interests, but India should invest relatively more in the long-term, strategy of geoeconomic connectivity.
It actually has been doing that, but more needed: https://www.brookings.edu/research/sambandh-as-strategy-indias-new-approach-to-regional-connectivity/
It actually has been doing that, but more needed: https://www.brookings.edu/research/sambandh-as-strategy-indias-new-approach-to-regional-connectivity/
12 So I hope the above helps a little to illustrate Delhi’s dilemmas and challenges in addressing the crisis in Nepal — and how there are significant similarities with other crises in the neighborhood.
Phew, sorry this grew into quite a thread...
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Phew, sorry this grew into quite a thread...
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