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This book by @WWATMD manages to merge many of my favorite themes into one cohesive argument ranging from theory to balanced forces to how to incorporate a range of ideas for more holistic employment so no potential ideas are forestalled from consideration. 1/
The book looks at 8 case studies from the Navy's early history. Lately I've been criticizing book titles for claiming too much. Arguably this book title doesn't claim enough re how relevant this book is for #miltwitter readership. It isn't just an arcane dive into old stuff 2/
This is how most of us tend to think of naval history: duels between big ships, but Armstrong repeatedly challenges that ideas, and in the course of his book "irregular" warfare seems pretty regular and commonplace in US naval history. 3/
3 types of naval warfare: 1) guerre d'escadre (defeat of the fleet) 2) guerre de course (capture or destruction of commerce) & 3) the little known guerre de razzia (war by raiding) p. 199 Armstrong does concede, though, that 1 + 2 should possibly be considered "dominant" p. 13 4/
John Paul Jones has been too closely associated with "open-water battles fought by warships" p. 4 & not closely enough with war by raiding. He should be considered "father of naval irreg warfare" Now take this ex and multiply it by x 100 and you know what this book is about 5/
Very tactically minded raids could have significant strategic implications, such as forcing the Brits to "redistribute their force" and even have psych, pol, & econ effects p. 20, p. 33 even if they were not "sufficient for success" p. 36 6/
The case of the Quasi-War reminds us that gradations between peace and war aren't brand new, as USN found itself in "hybrid conflict where war, politics, naval diplomacy, rev fervor, & race-based fears of salve revolt complicated" maritime operations p. 40 7/
We also see Navy drawing on COTS tech, like a converted merchantman & merchant sloops "filled with American officers and seamen" that lead to some discussions of risk & initiative. What happens when daring tactical action has unforeseen strategic consequences? p. 41, 49, 91 8/
On the Barbary Coast, blue-water solutions like convoy escort, patrol & blockade aren't enough. "Bringing the war to a positive result required something more"---integrating irregular ops & "shallow-water combat" into "overall campaign plan" p. 70 9/
Still, the "pendulum" can swing the other way, as it did under Jefferson's naval policy that stressed gunboats for coastal defense at expense of the right amount of blue-water vessels p. 71 10/
Within USN, there were largely 2 camps of officers: those with blue water experience and those with irreg & raiding experience in more shallow waters. When blue water type ops stalemated, then irreg warfare offered new openings p. 78 11/
Thus just as non-kinetic effects need to be integrated throughout all states of planning with kinetic effects, so, too, do irregular warfare effects need to be holistically considered with "overall strategy" p. 90 12/
The blue-ops frigate duels of the War of 1812 largely morphed into something else as the war's "character" changed, esp. when Royal Navy blockaded US ships p. 100 and green & brown water now >>>> blue water with "stealth attacks & initiation of undersea warfare" p. 101 13/
Civilians+innovators+USN officers begin torpedo attacks vs Royal Navy in a kind of maritime = of IEDs in Iraq p. 111 This new tech is actually less important than the "platforms form which the Americans launched them" and the skill & training needed to make them work p. 118 /14
Ironically, after War of 1812, pendulum swings other way with attempt to build a near-peer navy but the "next maritime challenge the US faced was again an irregular one" with the Navy's old friend of "maritime insecurity" in the Caribbean with state & non-state actors 123,146 15/
For more than 20 years, the USN's role was to make the slogan "free ships make free goods" mean something, which put it at the "heart of the maritime legal, diplo, and mil conflicts" the US had with European nations p. 126 16/
Next up is the Navy halfway around the world in Sumatra because #pepper. USN ops give US merchants a huge leg up there. But, importantly, "maritime security ops did not provide decisive finality and keeping relationships open"=crucial to "follow-on ops" p. 170 17/
In conclusion: In wartime irreg warfare & raiding missions are important option to consider to achieve "larger op & strategic aims" while in peacetime they "fill the gray area between war and peace" p. 191 18/
Often there is more creative innovation in irreg warfare because new acq is at smaller scale & thus faces less org & cultural opposition p. 194 & a diff type of leader required vs more trad vision of naval officer trying to cross the T to win decisive fleet engagement p. 195 19/
He challenges Geoffrey Till's division of modern & post-modern navies w/ modern being blue-water built for fleet battles & power projection vs today's post-modern navies "focused on sea control in littoral regions, expeditionary ops..& maint. of a maritime consensus"p.196 20/
The US Navy, he argues, has always had modern & post-modern aspects. This passage really sums up the argument that Armstrong wants to make where the marks are below: 21/
I'm a big fan of books that take us out of our normal frame of reference for thinking about themes that continue to resonate today, and these case studies certainly do that. And you can get this great book here: https://www.amazon.com/Small-Boats-Daring-Men-Commanders/dp/0806162821/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=armstrong+small+boats&qid=1593339165&sr=8-1 /22 & end
