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The #AUPSC just published its June 17th communiqué on Sudan.
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/eng-931st-final-communique-sudan-17-june-2020.pdf
While it provides good insights into the emerging #AUPSC political strategy, there is one glaring error that exposes the diplomatic landmine awaiting the #UNSC and #AUPSC in the fall. (1/x)
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/eng-931st-final-communique-sudan-17-june-2020.pdf
While it provides good insights into the emerging #AUPSC political strategy, there is one glaring error that exposes the diplomatic landmine awaiting the #UNSC and #AUPSC in the fall. (1/x)
The #AUPSC is entrenching its position as the multilateral guarantor for the Juba Peace Process. It urges more diplomatic support for the mediation (including from IGAD) and is starting to back up earlier commitments to sanction those obstructing the process. (2/x)
Conversely, the document is rather muted about #AUPSC engagement on the governance transition, save one paragraph. While @UNITAMS has a direct mandate here, #AUPSC political leverage will be needed if governance reforms stall (i.e. the Transitional National Legislature) (3/x)
The #AUPSC keeps the US #SST issue at the forefront of its diplomatic engagement, building off its Feb 2020 meeting with both US and Sudanese officials. Interesting note that @AUC_MoussaFaki and the Panel of the Wise are playing behind-the-scenes roles. (4/x)
The #AUPSC also reiterates its desire for the @AU_PSD to play a peacebuilding role. However, it's interesting that this operative paragraph is linked to the peace process, and not to other issues like COVID19 or the humanitarian situation that are discussed elsewhere (5/x)
It also highlights how the #AUPSC is not silent on issues of justice and reconciliation, with a necessary reference to the independent investigations into the 03 June 2019 massacre. This is an important area where the #UNSC is constrained diplomatically from discussing (6/x)
Despite positive aspects of this Communiqué, there is a glaring error: UNSC Resolution 2525 DOES NOT mandate that @unamidnews complete its exit by Dec 31, 2020. It only says that the #UNSC must decide on its next course of action by 12/31 (7/x)
On the one hand, this could be a factual error. On the other hand (and perhaps more likely), the #AUPSC language is a 'shot across the bow'. @unamidnews extension was debated fiercely within the #UNSC, and the Dec date was a compromise facilitated in part by the #AUPSC (8/x)
How long @unamidnews continues past Dec will be the core debate of the next mandate. Diplomats are already dreading what will likely be tense and difficult negotiations. This communiqué places the #AUPSC on the side of the Sudanese gov, which wants the mission gone ASAP (9/x)
Regardless of what the Sudanese desire, it is both diplomatically and logistically impossible for @unamidnews to exit by December, as described by @Lacroix_UN in his April briefing, in part because of #COVID19, in part b/c of the rainy season, and in part b/c of @UNITAMS (10/x)
The #UNSC asked for a Special Report by the end of October that should detail options for resuming the drawdown. UNAMID's presence continues to be a hot-button issue within Sudan and amongst the diplomatic community. This communiqué adds yet another complicating factor (11/x)
It will be a delicate and fascinating dance to see how this gets negotiated and resolved. And as we've seen with much of the @UN transition in Sudan over the past two years, a lot of what ultimately happens may be determined by factors outside of the #UNSC or the #AUPSC (12/x)
FYI: @UNPeacekeeping @UNDPPA @AU_PSD @LaurenBinDC @jnbptst @GerritKurtz @AshishSPradhan @RichardGowan1 @ipinst @gb_decarvalho @priyal_singh @CedricdeConing @_hudsonc @husnimustafa1 @AdamDayNYC @africa_amani @ipinst @PSCReport
