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(THREAD) 1/ In this article for @ForeignPolicy on #Syria, I discuss a complicated but immensely important topic: the weaponization of humanitarian assistance by the Syrian regime. Spoiler: things CAN be fixed. #SyriaConf2020 https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/24/how-to-aid-syria-without-aiding-assad/
2/ Three paradoxes: i/UN/NGOs do great work assisting millions but accept regime hijacking of aid ii/EU&US provided $30bn of UN aid since 2011 but don't push back on aid diversion iii/UN/NGOs centralize ops in Damascus but don't fix the system & ignore a fragmented huma reality.
3/ i/ The huma response in #Syria is a logistical masterpiece & an ethical conundrum: the UN has set one of the most robust coordination systems but the huma community is paralyzed on diversion, despite multiple reports 
@HaidHaid22 @hrw @TheSyriaCmpgn @ScprSyria @annie_sparrow
@HaidHaid22 @hrw @TheSyriaCmpgn @ScprSyria @annie_sparrow
4/ ii/ #EU & #US provide 90% of #UN aid to #Syria but don't seem to react to aid diversion by regime. They fear being accused of politicizing assistance or of weakening the UN. Meanwhile #Russia provides 0,3% of UN aid but has disproportionate influence on UN huma mechanisms.
5/ iii/ This leads to two blind spots re #ceasaract: a/ Debate on impact/efficiency of sanctions is legit but it’s hard to see how lifting them now would not lead to even bigger weaponization than those documented for past humanitarian projects.
6/ b/ A "Bachar won the war" narrative is used to justify organizing huma ops from Damascus. But this ignores how fragmented Syria still is in & out: 16,6m Syrians in need, only 7m in regime area. Each situation requires specific answers, not giving more control to Damascus.
7/ What can be done? Donors could increase their funding to the huma community but dispatch it differently between UN Agencies and NGOs, in a way that strengthens those with a better record at staying impartial. The track record of some UN agencies & NGOs in Damascus isn't great.
8/ Then, there are so many other ways to help Syrians that donors should be ready to shift funding from one partner to another within & outside the UN when there is collusion with the regime. Syrian NGOs and diaspora are also key partners to identify alternatives.
9/ The goal is to improve accountability and transparency in order to increase what Syrians actually receive. The aim is to create competition, which UN leadership can use to fix the system. Many people within the humanitarian community want to improve aid governance.
10/ Aid diversion is sadly an old problem in #Syria but there is a window of opportunity to address it now: the #SyriaConf2020 on June 29/30th & the current #UNSC nego on the renewal of the cross border mechanism offer an opportunity for donors to act. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2020/06/30/
11/ The priority is to save the UN cross border mechanism expiring on July 10th & one way to do it is to make clear that money dedicated to this mechanism won't be relocated to Damascus if UNSC resolution 2504 is not renewed.
12/ But Xborder assistance is just another aspect of the same question: how to reach people in need in non loyalist areas? Parallel to negotiations at the UNSC, donors should look for alternatives adapted to each humanitarian reality: regime areas, NW, NE, neighboring countries.
13/ To be clear: the scale of violations in #Syria will affect UN & NGO operations everywhere in the world. The way principles have been protected or undermined will shape the way they work in the future. What happens to Syria doesn't stay in Syria. (END) https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/24/how-to-aid-syria-without-aiding-assad/
