Analysis of some key points made by Yun Sun:
1) China feels Indian infrastructure near LAC violates prior agreements and attempts to take advantage of Chinese weakness during COVID-19. We see them as on India's side of the LAC. China may not (but still won't exchange maps). [1/n] https://twitter.com/Cold_Peace_/status/1275816604622782466

2) Having built up infrastructure on its own side of the LAC, as part of the 13th Five Year Plan, China wants to "put an end to the infrastructure arms race." India's infrastructure has enabled "repeated incursions and changes to the status quo, and therefore needs to be stopped"

3) China sees its actions as defensive. "Chinese officials concluded that India was leveraging China’s weaknesses to make territorial gains in the disputed region."

"India’s road-building is seen as 'an attempt to stab it in the back while China was trying to deal with' the US"

"Because of COVID-19 and the sustained criticism China has suffered due to its role in the delayed response globally, officials in Beijing feel particularly vulnerable to perceived attacks on China, both in narratives and in reality"

4) China doesn't want to exchange maps. ("Attempts to clarify the LAC will not bring clarity, but chaos and complications") but it does want a "package deal" roughly aligning with the status quo. The big catch (as it's been for over a decade): China still wants Tawang.

5) China doesn't believe this is a strategic blunder. "since Beijing sees a neutral India as untenable to begin with, tactical gains that can bog India down along the [LAC], frustrate New Delhi’s regional and global ambitions, and remind India of the eventual need for compromise"

"If a strategic friendship with India is untenable, it frees up room for tactical gains. In the near term, China’s tactical objective seems clear —to advance its position roughly to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war"