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Lets take a deeper dive on Yun Sun's WOTR article on the Galwan-Pangong crisis. She does as good a job as any in trying to deconstruct China's thinking.
To start, she argues, as I have, that Indian infrastructure was the main cause for China's adventure. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/
To start, she argues, as I have, that Indian infrastructure was the main cause for China's adventure. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/
"Tactically,China wants to put an end to the infrastructure arms race along the border...Chinese see Indian infrastructure development in the area from which China withdrew after the 1962 war as a consistent & repeated effort by Delhi that 'needs to be corrected every few years'”
"Historically, the Chinese consistently stick to the LAC of Nov. 7, 1959 and the Indians stick to the LAC of Sept. 8, 1962. China argues the territory between the two LACs was 'unjustly occupied by India' during those three years and was precisely the cause of the [1962 War.]
"According to Chinese government analysts that I’ve spoken with, the precondition for China not to enter the 20-kilometer zone from the 1959 LAC (from which it withdrew in 1962) is that India would refrain from entering as well."
"For the Chinese, the infrastructure arms race in the border region has enabled the repeated incursions and changes to the status quo, and therefore needs to be stopped. Otherwise, all the things China fought for in the 1962 war would have been in vain."
"Chinese officials do not want to engage in legal and political battles on the clarification of the LAC, which had been a priority with India before 2003...since 2008, clarification of the LAC has been removed from official bilateral documents."
"The Chinese see the clarification of the LAC as an impossible, lost cause because the two sides simply do not share the same historical records or perspectives. Attempts to clarify the LAC will not bring clarity, but chaos and complications"
"China’s priority remains crisis management and escalation prevention, until India is willing to embrace a package deal which basically follows the earlier trade between the eastern section and the western section, with the exception of Tawang."
"While the Chinese understand the Indian sense of urgency to resolve issues between the two countries, Beijing sees the unsettled border as leverage to bog down India in the region and undermine its global potential."
"While China is trying to ease the seemingly bottomless deterioration of relations with the United States due to the COVID-19 crisis, India’s road-building is seen as “an attempt to stab it [China] in the back while China was trying to deal with” the United States."
"not only is India trying to capitalize on China’s moment of distraction, vulnerability, and overextension...it also puts China in a dilemma between responding to India’s road construction and being labeled 'aggressive and provocative'—or acquiescing to it and losing territory"
"Because of COVID-19 and the sustained criticism China has suffered...officials in Beijing feel particularly vulnerable to perceived attacks on China...It has been more prone to escalatory and assertive responses in both diplomacy and military/paramilitary actions."
"The current crisis was the result of China reacting to the perception that India was stabbing it in the back by its move into territories China sees as off-limits to India."
"for Beijing, standing up for its interests & territorial claims is worth the cost. India is believed to be strategically unreliable to begin with and China has no interest in acquiescing to India’s attempt to advance its position on territorial disputes to trade for concessions"
"If a strategic friendship with India is untenable, it frees up room for tactical gains. In the near term, China’s tactical objective seems clear —to advance its position roughly to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war."
"This will push the Chinese presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, making the Galwan Valley off limits to India. The Chinese construction of posts in this location clearly points to this direction."
"Whether this position is sustainable remains unclear, as the Chinese may not be able to station troops at this location during the winter months. However, China sees these actions as military retaliations to India’s persistent infrastructure development in the region"
"The heart of the matter is that India believes the construction it is conducting is on its undisputed territory. But since there is no boundary, the Chinese see the Indian construction as changing the status quo. These two perspectives will be hard to reconcile."
"trick for Beijing is to maintain the struggle on the ground without triggering a war...It’s a long process of friction and attrition. The tactical objective of returning to [1962 LAC] could be to inflate China’s negotiation position and force India to accept the fait accompli."
"since Beijing sees a neutral India as untenable to begin with, tactical gains that can bog India down along the[LAC], frustrate New Delhi’s regional & global ambitions, & remind India of the eventual need for compromise may not be the worst case in China’s cost-benefit analysis"