I agree a US-India alliance is a chimera.

But, devil's advocate, there's another way to see this: India already, some time back, picked "the US's" side in Indo-Pac competition. Things is, the "side" is not as coherent or as US-led as Cold War analogies suggest... (1/n) https://twitter.com/NarangVipin/status/1275567554929573889

Cold War-style blocs are no longer possible. The "US's side" in this Indo-Pac competition is a looser coalition, w/variable degrees of engagement & hostility to China.

Its members generally all trade heavily & engage productively w/China, often don't see eye to eye w/US. (2/n)

The US itself is hardly a fully-committed paid-up member - its out of TPP, still ignores Southeast Asia, & routinely shivs its all-important allies. Hardly the behavior of a disciplined leader of a bloc. (3/n)

To the extent this "side" exists, its better characterized as suspicious of China, rather than led by US. And its a v big tent, w/varying levels of commitment, depending on the issue.

Those that condemn Ch land grabs ≠ those that ban Huawei ≠ those that sail thru SCS. (4/n)

To the extent this "side" exists, India has been a founding member (per @tanvi_madan's book). Its tactics have varied, to chagrin of some hawks, tho maybe that'll change w/Galwan. Its Russian mil kit may impede US-Ind mil coop, but it doesn't dilute Ind distrust of China. (5/n)

Its moved a mile in the direction of embracing US: arms sales, foundational agreements, hi-level consults.

But, at least as important, its embraced others suspicious of China - even absent US leadership/involvement. This is key to the broad tent anti-China "side." (6/n)

India's relationships with Japan, Australia, France, ROK, Singapore, etc etc are independent of the US (tho some were enabled, encouraged by the US). And its this that gives the suspicious-of-China "side" an incoherence - but also vitality, resilience - lacking in Cold War. (7/n)

What remains an open Q in my mind is whether the broadness & looseness of the "side" is an asset or a liability. It obviously includes many members; but inclusiveness usually entails a trade-off against effectiveness. (8/n)

Clearly that inclusiveness/effectiveness balance will vary across different issues.

Key for US & India will be maintaining positive momentum. And for those purposes, Galwan probably didn't hurt. (9/9)