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Since the protective divide separating Muslims from polytheists was degraded and finally collapsed entirely, conflicts between Muslims have been increasingly defined by the social divides between the kuffar, as we become an extension of the kaffir civilization.
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The most obvious example right now is the Qatari-Saudi conflict, where Trump is clearly backing Saudi, and Qatar is aligned with the political left in Europe and the US.
But a less obvious example which recently occurred to me is the possibility of the AQ-IS feud being...
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But a less obvious example which recently occurred to me is the possibility of the AQ-IS feud being...
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...an extension of the modern global class system.
AQ's ethos has always been that of a vanguard or elite, while IS made gains by appealing to the masses. Bin Laden came from a wealthy family, while Abu Musab az-Zarqawi came from a rougher, less privileged background...
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AQ's ethos has always been that of a vanguard or elite, while IS made gains by appealing to the masses. Bin Laden came from a wealthy family, while Abu Musab az-Zarqawi came from a rougher, less privileged background...
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...on the streets. And on the streets, your credentials or educational background mean nothing, and your actions mean everything.
This still seems to show in IS's priorities. They are not very concerned with courting scholarly approval. Instead they seek to establish...
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This still seems to show in IS's priorities. They are not very concerned with courting scholarly approval. Instead they seek to establish...
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...their status by their effectiveness on the ground. They deride Zawahiri, who is a medical doctor from an elite family, for being disconnected from the reality of jihad, living, as it were, in a kind of ivory tower of theory.
And if we look at the leadership of AQ...
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And if we look at the leadership of AQ...
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...it seems their status is not derived from pre-colonial avenues of power. This is, obviously, due largely to the fact that the original Islamic power structures in the Muslim lands were completely destroyed during the process of the Western takeover (which I define as...
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...beginning with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and ending with the dismantling of the Uthmani empire).
Once professions, or more importantly, the social trappings surrounding professions, were introduced into Muslim societies, it was bound to introduce the same kinds...
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Once professions, or more importantly, the social trappings surrounding professions, were introduced into Muslim societies, it was bound to introduce the same kinds...
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...of tensions which existed in the native contexts of those professional hierarchies.
Doctor, for example, was an established profession in the Muslim lands, but it had nowhere near the political significance that it does in the liberal nation-state, which derives...
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Doctor, for example, was an established profession in the Muslim lands, but it had nowhere near the political significance that it does in the liberal nation-state, which derives...
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...a significant portion of its legitimacy from science and medicine.
This hierarchy only developed in Europe relatively late into the colonial period, as Christianity declined as a justification for empire, and modern science took its place. It was then exported...
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This hierarchy only developed in Europe relatively late into the colonial period, as Christianity declined as a justification for empire, and modern science took its place. It was then exported...
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...throughout the empire (including to the Muslim majority possessions).
The center of power of this knowledge remained, until now, in the Western Roman lineage (W Europe, USA, Canada, Australia). This is because it is a resource dependent claim to superiority...
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The center of power of this knowledge remained, until now, in the Western Roman lineage (W Europe, USA, Canada, Australia). This is because it is a resource dependent claim to superiority...
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...which was only made possible by the early success of the empire, when Christianity was still used as the main justification.
This means that any society that builds its institutions on the basis of this knowledge will be dependent on the centers of that knowledge.
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This means that any society that builds its institutions on the basis of this knowledge will be dependent on the centers of that knowledge.
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So when building a society on this basis, you have the advantage of tapping into an established and recognized power structure. You open a sort of "local franchise" of the European empiricist "brand."
The disadvantage is that you will always be subordinate to the HQ.
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The disadvantage is that you will always be subordinate to the HQ.
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The present hegemonic order is one that tolerates states based on this knowledge base, and aggressively attacks those that are not. As a result, rejecting the legitimacy of Western knowledge seems like a descent into savagery, as it becomes necessary to hold together...
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...the social order with pure violence.
This is only the case, however, in the absence of another legitimizing system of knowledge. Of course, for Muslims this system is the sharia.
So this becomes a kind of a "chicken and egg" problem.
A state can only be achieved...
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This is only the case, however, in the absence of another legitimizing system of knowledge. Of course, for Muslims this system is the sharia.
So this becomes a kind of a "chicken and egg" problem.
A state can only be achieved...
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...with authentic and independent sources of institutional legitimacy, but such sources of institutional legitimacy can only be achieved in the presence of a state.
A (possibly) legitimate criticism of Madkhalism towards contemporary jihad comes to mind here.
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A (possibly) legitimate criticism of Madkhalism towards contemporary jihad comes to mind here.
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It's the influence of revolutionary political thought on thinkers like Sayyid Qutb. They argue that this influence is foreign to Islam. At the same time, this "foreign" thinking provides the conceptual tools for navigating the modern political landscape.
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