Today, very much as the 15-16, I feel sad, though for other reasons.
Today, I learned that Mamata Banerjee, Sharad Pawar, Mayawati, indeed the whole political class bar the INC and CPI(M) is more mature than a whole swathe of Indian journalists and commentators.

Unfortunately, the latter category includes many that I held in high respect including veterans and the country's oldest and best aviation journal. To see so many react like children or with mindless vitriol or trolling was very sad.

Emotions are running high but hysteria is no substitute for thought and ranting is not responding.

I'd like to make a few comments on the existing situation. At the outset, I owe no allegiance to any political party or person in India.
I would also say that, those who know me, know that my academic & professional background involves extensive published work on India's military

There is a myth that against China, the purpose of the Indian military is to defend "every inch" of Indian territory.
Wrong.
The Indian military is tasked, should China start a shooting war, with inflicting as many casualties and damage on Chinese forces as possible.

Some territory is expected to be lost in order to exact as high a toll on China as possible in order to bring it home to the PRC that there is no easy victory and certainly no cheap one.

For this task, the Indian military is very well placed.
Things could be better, but it is still very well placed.
We might wish it could invade and retake Aksai Chin, but reality dictates otherwise for now
You deal with what capabilities you have, not what you might desire.

The reality is that the PM's speech spoke specifically of Eastern Ladakh and said there is no incursion and no Indian posts have fallen. All of that is true - more on Galwan in a while (there is a twist).

With respect to F4 to F8 in the Pangong Tso region, it is undoubtedly true that China has changed the status quo.
However, some stark and ugly facts need to be stated:

1) India has never had any control over the F4 to F8 region.
2) India was able to patrol to F8 but never sustained a presence nor exerted control over any point past F4.
3) From 1999 China build a road to which India did not object, disrupt or destroy.

4) From 1999 onwards, no Indian General in charge of Northern Command, including one most vociferous on the media about "Chinese boots on Indian fingers" established either an outpost, planted a flag, a tent, a spitoon or chamberpot to establish an Indian presence from F4 onwards

5) The reality is that once China's road was completed, India lost control over F4 to F8, if it ever had any before.
6) Nothing that has happened to date has indicated India yielding to China's version of the LAC which goes to F2.

7) Unlike the LOC, there is no internationally accepted LAC in some areas which means that a non-kinetic move into areas where "perception differs" yields benefits to those who can move fast and establish and sustain a presence. China did just that.

8) Unlike Galwan, Hot Springs etc, India is at a huge disadvantage beyond f4 because of terrain. Building a road through one access point is well nigh impossible.
9) It seems that the Chinese actions were detected but whether there was the ability to stop them at F8 is debatable

10) Remember the big distraction - COVID- which hit Ladakh and caused the cancellation of the brigade exercise, thus slowing any Indian response.

With these real limitations in mind, I'd like to state another ugly fact:
Kinetic Indian action without China having starting a shooting war will be counterproductive at present
Like it or not, perceptions of who is the aggressor and who is not, matters a great deal.

While India can fight and sustain a defensive war unaided, it might require a little more support, at least tacitly, if it initiated offensive action. Things may change in the future, but not yet.

Given the near hysteria from many who should know better, had the PM said that "China has taken our territory from F4 to F8", the public pressure for immediate military action would have been huge.

With that, any chance for a flexible, multi-pronged response with economic, diplomatic and military measures at a time and place of India's choosing, would have been completely lost. Worse, any action would have led to a general war along the LAC at a time of China's choice

Patience and resolve with a deployment of forces to prevent any kinetic operation by China to oust our forces are the key to this crisis.
Sumdrong Chu, took seven years to resolve with forces on both sides deployed. Even then, the LAC there, is not mutually agreed.

China's aggression has to be met with a rational response by raising the stakes for China diplomatically, economically and, where the situation allows, militarily while holding them at all other points of confrontation.

A certain ex Colonel claimed "at least Nehru chose to fight in 1962".
That led to what?
A war on China's terms where India tried to defend indefensible posts.
Frederick the Great said "He who defends everything, defends nothing"
Don't make the same mistake in 2020

After the deaths of 15-16 June, there is a clamour for revenge.
Totally understandable.
However, let it be done at a time and place of India's choosing and not communicated by the PM as desired by so many on the internet and the press.

This is a very serious situation and so far, the response from the keyboard commandos, some veterans and the media has been immature. Things are bad. Don't take away the means to respond flexibly by demanding immediate reactions or even public statements on some issues.

Note that we hear a lot about Chinese troop dispositions. Don't assume that the Indian military is any weaker along the LAC.
The military balance favours an Indian defence.
Be patient.
Be resolute.
Be prepared.
This is going to be a long-haul and is not for the faint-hearted.

Now to the clash at Galwan on 15-16 June 2020:
There is a twist.
Please look at this video (I'm no fan of him as a person but when he tries, he is a good journalist) from 12:45 onwards

As I understand things, one of those tents was a little inside Indian turf.
Where was the second from which Chinese troops were evicted?
Given how close things are, could it be that Indian troops were lured a bit across the LAC?

Subject to correction, as I understand it, the LAC passes over the ridge.
Was one tent a few metres on the Chinese side?
If the Chinese in any way obstructed the flow of the river and Indian troops (and their's) died falling into the river, that would be before the stoppage

If so - and again subject to correction - the violence could have taken place on the Chinese side with Indian troops, trying to compel the disengagement protocols, being lured into a calculated ambush.

If so, and again, subject to correction, it would tally with both the interpretations of what the PM said "there is no intrusion" or "there was no intrusion". There may have been an attempted intrusion or else, is it possible the tent on the Indian side was bait for the ambush?

No idea is it impossible?
Whatever the case, 16 Bihar ensured - at great cost - that no Chinese tent, OP or whatever, is at PP14 and not on the Indian side of the LAC.
As horrible as it is to say (because of the cost), they succeeded in stopping the Chinese in that respect