Yes, but. Cov. mil. ops. via SFF can be effective in targeting PLA lines of comms. But are not an unknown entity for Beijing & they have had their share of failures (& successes) in the past. 1/n https://twitter.com/abhijnanrej/status/1273191114934124546

Cyber ops are an option. But here China has huge rel. adv. & these are essentially shaping ops & not signaling ops. Q is can India shape Chinese decision making via the back stage w/ such asymmetry in covert capabilities? Possible, but not highly probable. 2/n

This will have to be done simultaneously w/ front stage signaling (in Ladakh or elsewhere). Again, possible, but hugely risky. On mil. ops. India will find exfils more difficult than infil (making SFF/SG ops suicidal) Pak does that to w/ huge army of expendable jihadis. 3/n

Ind cannot afford that w/ the highly trained Tibetans. Moreover, the other Q is what one views as an exploitable in China. Options galore but not straightforward. Tibetans, Uighurs? Any spark of an insurgency will be culled quickly, making it low yield for intervening power. 4/n

Being a staging ground for such ops. is interesting & w/ historical parallel. But again, this requires clear exploitables and long term pol. will & commitment among India’s partners (US, Japan, Australia, etc) that is not apparent atm. 5/n

But, Ind can exploit China’s v visible vulnerabilities with other SE Asian neighbours. Myanmar, Vietnam, etc. Tough border regions with heavy Chinese influence — and areas where Beijing has lot to lose. Just imagine if the stable Sino-Burmese border erupts in flames? 6/n

To make this happen, Ind intelligence leadership will require a lot of imagination and dip. & pol. support & resources. Both exist to an extent atm domestically, but a conducive external environment will take more time to be built. But then, this shld have been done by now? 7/n