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As conversations continue about reforms to law enforcement, I think we should also talk about revenue-motivated policing. It’s the result of bad fiscal incentives and systemic racism. But I think it can be fixed.
What is revenue-motivated policing? In short: instead of supporting public safety, a nontrivial part of policing behavior can be explained by the financial returns to those actions. The money comes from things like traffic citations, court fees, and asset forfeiture.
Why does revenue-motivated policing happen? Law enforcement is funded locally, so when local governments lose revenues they were expecting, law enforcement seems to respond with more revenue generation. These revenues represent about 2% of city $ nationally.
The most prominent paper on the subject is from @mikemakowsky & Stratmann in AER. Shows traffic citations ↑ when property tax overrides for additional revenue fail. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.99.1.509
Others (Su 2020; Garett & Wagner 2009) find similar patterns.
Others (Su 2020; Garett & Wagner 2009) find similar patterns.
But this is not just a fiscal issue. Revenue-motivated policing happens more frequently in communities of color. The 2015 DOJ report on Ferguson highlighted this in horrifying fashion.
Why is this the case? One theory is that if law enforcement is trying to maximize revenue, it targets groups with less power (i.e. low income, racial & ethnic minorities).
Sances & @hyeyoungyou provide evidence of this in @The_JOP. They show that Black communities rely more on $ from fines, but that this is reduced by Black representation on city councils. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/691354
Another theory: if police are not representative of their community, minorities will be targeted. With coauthors Drs. Kirschner & Stone, we show fines are highest in cities where police are whiter than the population + have more black residents. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087419834632
Some of the reforms I’ve seen proposed might be interpreted as addressing the issue by moving traffic enforcement – the largest source of revenue – to a different agency. Unfortunately, I don’t think this will solve the problem.
As long as there is a financial return to policing – in whatever form it exists – there will be the potential for revenue-motivated enforcement. And that enforcement will fall on groups with less power.
So, what should we do? Sever the link between police actions and revenue. There’s no reason fines, fees, and forfeitures should accrue directly to the arresting officer’s local government. Aggregate it at the state level and direct it toward cities via a formula.
Worth noting that @mikemakowsky has a more detailed proposal that I think is important reading for anyone thinking about solutions in this area. http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Makowsky_PP_20190314.pdf
My colleague Dr. Siân Mughan has some evidence that that this reform could work. When local governments don’t retain the revenue from traffic stops, ticketing drops significantly. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392412
