What is tactical airpower? It seems that some tend to reduce tactical airpower to close air support and assume that the Air Force's primary role is to provide direct support to the Army on the battlefield above all other things. But is it? ..1/

@mike_bechthold's book about tac airpower argues it is not; rather, the best form of tactical support often occurs off the battlefield. This argument aligns with some other historians as well as what many airmen thought back in the inter-war period and WWII. 2/

If this seems like he and others might be drinking too much blue kool-aid, it is important to consider the adv the US has had in air superiority over the past decades not to mention the #s game it has been able to play 3/

Bechtold takes us to an early period in WWII when the RAF was not winning #s game to tell the story of Raymond Collishaw, who he argues hasn't received proper credit for est key WWII ideas about proper air ground employment, with Arthur Coningham getting too much credit 4/

A lot of times when we think about why strategic bombing got so much emphasis at expense of CAS, we tend to stress dogmatism of bomber barons. But there's another key ingredient: Collishaw had done a lot of CAS and attack in WWI, and he knew the costs of doing it at the time 5/

In WWI Collishaw killed 61 aircraft and 8 observation balloons. He much preferred that to attack because he watched his squadron suffer attrition rates of more than 30% and he worried that enough loss of pilots would mean the loss of air superiority (9) 6/

He had a lot of important experiences in the inter-war period, one of which was at HQ of Air Defence of Great Britain, where he learned that it was really inefficient to use standing fighter patrols to intercept bombers (13) 7/

In 1940, the British squared of against Italy in the western Desert (Brits from Egypt, Italians from present-day Libya). British were more mechanized, but Italians had 215,000 soldiers plus 200,000 to reinforce (35). GB had 36,000. Italy had about 200 bombers, 200 fighters...8/

but could reinforce more easily. GB had three fighter squadrons, six bomber squadrons, and some other stuff, 81 aircraft of which he put on his forward airfields 35 both air forces were more or less equally obsolete. 9/

Collishaw was aggressive. His approach was make attacks "small in scale but wide in scope" (40). Italy responded with defensive patrols that ensured most aircraft weren't hitting British on ground as they prepared their offensive including his ONE precious Hurricane, which he 10/

used deceptively to make it seem like he had a lot more than one. 41 When Italians did attack, though, the British lost airfields. Some believe, indeed that the "motif" of British ops in Middle East="battle for aerodromes" 50 & Now British went on offensive with Op Compass,11/

Now RAF had e qualitative adv in airplanes, but still re #s: RAF's 48 fighters, 116 bombers vs Italy's 191 fighters, 140 bombers. Also, as often the case, diversions are going on in Greece. Meanwhile, Brits progressing on ground while Collishaw is focused mostly on air sup 12/

and cutting fighters providing close support 65 the point @mike_bechthold wants to make is "RAF off ops....largely blunted any serious attempts by enemy aircraft to stop the advance. The majority of Italian sorties were def ops in reaction to Collishaw's moves 13/

Airpower is also earning its pay by acting as force multiplier for British to take heavily defended Bardia, the fortress/seaport the Italians were determined to defend. British take it although outnumbered 2-1 in manpower & 4-1 in artillery 74 14/

Brits keep pushing, advancing 500 miles and defeating 14 divisions, capturing 130,000 prisoners and 500 tanks with 2000 casualties (500 KIA) 109 Collishaw's leadership in this was described as "every effort was made....to mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy" 111 but ...15/

"very few sorties were devoted exclusively to close-support missions" 119 rather 1) "impede the ability of enemy warplanes to resist the advance" 2) allows for "uncontested attacks on ...logistics...to isolate troops at front" & prevent reinforcements & resupply 16/

at this point British are exhausted and don't continue their push. @mike_bechthold debates this, and then bad news: Germans commit forces in Jan 41 under Rommel, resulting in everything British had gained lost in 2 weeks. Airpower covers withdrawals to slow enemy pursuit 134 17/

BUT the "German advance was largely meaningless because there had been no 'victory of annihilation'" 143 . . the real loss was the crumbling relationships between RAF & Army that had enabled so much 18/

Meanwhile, RAF keeps constant attacks on G & I's air forces keeping them on def and away from valuable British resources including vital ports 152 And how to use AP continues in Op Brevity, with main goal for AP to isolate the battlefield, not provide air cover to it 154-55 19/

Meanwhile it gets worse in Crete--once Germans attack and once they gain control of airfields, the British have to fly from Libya and Egypt, again bringing up the issue of how much of this was a "battle for aerodromes" 160. Also, Crete again=major argument between Army & RAF 20/

Because of this, in Op Battleaxe--designed to relieve "besieged garrison at Torbruk" is another fight between RAF & Army that Army wins. As a result RAF provides airpower the way Army wants--umbrellas over the battlefield. Even though RAF had #s for 1st time 165... 21/

its "commitment to a defensive role negated the RAF's offensive contribution to the battle" 166 Its also interesting that Battleaxe=repeat of Op Brevity but on larger scale. Only change=use of RAF as umbrella over battlefield. Rommel, however, redeployed his forces based on LL22/

@mike_bechthold believes that failing to use RAF to 'interdict the movement of German reinforcements to the front during the crucial" first 48 hours army may explain the British loss 179; likewise: "deciding factor in the land battle 23/

was the ability of the enemy to react quicker to the developing situation" 183 And Collishaw and others believed that "distant attacks on enemy bases, airfields, ports" and LOCs=more effective than close support + force enemy to adopt def position 192 24/

After the losses in Battleaxe, Churchill put his foot down and let RAF use airpower in support of the ground as it saw fit (mainly air superiority then interdiction and THEN and only then more direct battlefield support 210-212) 25/

So...if you are interested in thinking about tac airpower, this is a great book to read. It's made more interesting by the fact that this is early in the war and the issue of how do you commit your resources when you don't have overwhelming numbers. Collishaw's answer was to 26/

take a highly offensive approach designed to keep enemy from taking a similar approach that would have attrited Brit supplies and/or troops. Some have criticized him for being too offensive minded (ex. Tedder) but @mike_bechthold argues against that. The end. 27/