Read on Twitter
1/ A thread with some thoughts on the DFID/FCO merger from someone who lived through and worked on the logistics of the Australian equivalent ( @dfat merging with AusAid in 2014).
This is a complex area with lots of greys. I'll try to be maximally fair to pros and cons. https://twitter.com/DmitryOpines/status/1272879142506291205
This is a complex area with lots of greys. I'll try to be maximally fair to pros and cons. https://twitter.com/DmitryOpines/status/1272879142506291205
2/ So first, what's the 'problem' this is meant to address?
In the Australian example (and it sounds like the UK too) there were two:
a) Redundancy
b) Misalignment
In the Australian example (and it sounds like the UK too) there were two:
a) Redundancy
b) Misalignment
3/ Redundancy
The argument here is that having two separate departments that work overseas, deploy people overseas at embassies and work on 'foreign' policy creates needless duplication.
Each has their own IT, HR, admin, you name it. The argument is consolidation = savings.
The argument here is that having two separate departments that work overseas, deploy people overseas at embassies and work on 'foreign' policy creates needless duplication.
Each has their own IT, HR, admin, you name it. The argument is consolidation = savings.
4/ Misalignment is more complex.
The argument runs that both DFID and FCO (or AusAid and DFAT) have the primary goal of advancing the national interest abroad.
However (it's argued) having them be distinct entities leads to their doing so independently and without coordination.
The argument runs that both DFID and FCO (or AusAid and DFAT) have the primary goal of advancing the national interest abroad.
However (it's argued) having them be distinct entities leads to their doing so independently and without coordination.
5/ The traditional (mostly unfair) gripe against DFID/AusAiders is that they think they work at an NGO like UNICEF or Save The Children.
That their only objective is rolling out good aid projects, not rolling out good aid projects in support of national interest objectives.
That their only objective is rolling out good aid projects, not rolling out good aid projects in support of national interest objectives.
6/ The traditional (mostly unfair) gripe against FCO/DFATers when it comes to aid is they think it's a slush fund to buy short-term love or trade for favors abroad.
That they're not interested in long term impact or good development practice, only transactionality.
That they're not interested in long term impact or good development practice, only transactionality.
7/ The traditional (occasionally fair) charge against both is that they work in silos and at cross purposes.
That the FCO/DFATer representing the government in Myanmar has no idea what the DFID/AusAider is rolling out in Myanmar three blocks away and vice versa.
That the FCO/DFATer representing the government in Myanmar has no idea what the DFID/AusAider is rolling out in Myanmar three blocks away and vice versa.
8/ All these are *gross* oversimplifications of course.
DFAT and AusAid each had over 3,000 employees when they merged, spread across something like 70 countries.
There were plenty of examples of misalignment and policy drift, just as there were plenty of great collaboration.
DFAT and AusAid each had over 3,000 employees when they merged, spread across something like 70 countries.
There were plenty of examples of misalignment and policy drift, just as there were plenty of great collaboration.
9/ The decision to actually merge DFAT/AusAid came very suddenly (basically on election night) but it had also been something people had talked about for some time.
In practice though, it was like 2 page note from government saying "make it happen" and "Godspeed."
In practice though, it was like 2 page note from government saying "make it happen" and "Godspeed."
10/ I can't overstate how disruptive it was in the short term, and how initially bad for morale.
Because the change was sudden, there were months and months when no one knew how it would actually work and so no one could tell the staff anything concrete.
Because the change was sudden, there were months and months when no one knew how it would actually work and so no one could tell the staff anything concrete.
11/ The logistics, both physical (we need to be in fewer buildings) and institutional (how do we restructure hundreds of sections to integrate AusAiders?) were near paralysing to the department.
Most of senior management (rightly) did little other than work on it for years.
Most of senior management (rightly) did little other than work on it for years.
12/ A bunch of unexepected problems emerged.
Your average DFAT Assistant Secretary (a fairly senior role, running an entire branch) might have managed a discretionary budget of a few thousand dollars.
An AusAid junior officer may have managed investments in the millions.
Your average DFAT Assistant Secretary (a fairly senior role, running an entire branch) might have managed a discretionary budget of a few thousand dollars.
An AusAid junior officer may have managed investments in the millions.
13/ When the departments merged, DFAT Assistant Secretaries suddenly found themselves having to sign off on investments exponentially larger than anything they'd ever seen before, without the training or experience to feel comfortable doing so.
14/ Another negative side effect of the merge (and budget cuts, it must be said) was letting go of a lot of AusAid regional specialists and advisors.
DFAT didn't really have an equivalent for their positions, and so many were let go. This cost the new Department.
DFAT didn't really have an equivalent for their positions, and so many were let go. This cost the new Department.
15/ DFAT and AusAid also had very different internal cultures.
DFATers (incorrectly) thought AusAiders were birkinstock wearing hippies living in a dream world.
AusAiders thought DFATers were insufferable, elitist sociopaths (so they had me pegged, but most DFATers are nice).
DFATers (incorrectly) thought AusAiders were birkinstock wearing hippies living in a dream world.
AusAiders thought DFATers were insufferable, elitist sociopaths (so they had me pegged, but most DFATers are nice).
16/ Five years after the DFAT/AusAid merger, the government undertook a review of how it's going and the results were decidedly mixed.
33% think the merger was a net positive... but
25% think the merger was strongly negative. https://www.themandarin.com.au/105619-mixed-reviews-for-dfat-ausaid-merger-five-years-on/
33% think the merger was a net positive... but
25% think the merger was strongly negative. https://www.themandarin.com.au/105619-mixed-reviews-for-dfat-ausaid-merger-five-years-on/
17/ The review also found that while the new DFAT had the right strategic vision, it's post-merger structure wasn't equipped to deliver.
Effectively, that the change was too fast and too sudden, creating strategic gaps and leaving risks to fester. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/reset-required-dfat-ausaid-integration
Effectively, that the change was too fast and too sudden, creating strategic gaps and leaving risks to fester. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/reset-required-dfat-ausaid-integration
18/ None of the above long (sorry) thread is meant to say the UK effort is either automatically bound for success or doomed to failure.
The UK Aid budget is 3.5x bigger than Australia's, and DFID is not just AusAid with London accents.
Just wanted to lay out some thoughts.
/end
The UK Aid budget is 3.5x bigger than Australia's, and DFID is not just AusAid with London accents.
Just wanted to lay out some thoughts.
/end
