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Anyway, I've been on a Levantine military history kick and wouldn't you know it, Israel just keeps popping up. Today let's talk about Operation Mole Cricket 19 or as I like to call it "The Day Israel Put the Fuck on the Syrian Air Force". Shall we?
Sometimes called the Bekaa Valley Turkey Shoot, the bottom line up front is that Israel planned and executed an aerial battle concurrent with the first SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) against modern Soviet IADS. For background, in 1981 Israel shot down two Syrian helos
in Lebanon, where the Syrian military operated with impunity (and occupied from the late 70s to the early 2000s). This was the latest in a series of escalations between Syria and Israel, often times played out on the streets and skies of Lebanon (with the Lebanese suffering the
fallout). Hafez al-Assad responded to the shoot down by establishing new SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley, Lebanon. While not the first Syrian SAMs in Lebanon, they were a direct message to Israel not to fuck with Syrian forces in Lebanon. A combination of SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6
SAM systems comprised a fairly formidable Integrated Air Defense System and while especially threatening to Israeli airspace, introduced considerable (perceived) risk over Lebanese airspace and made Israel look weak. Israeli media had extensively covered the threat of Syrian SAMs
to Israeli civil and military aviation and the public watched anxiously as Syria built up extensive batteries of tried and tested Soviet SAM systems, largely older, but with some newer models as well. Syrian armored forces were observed moving southwest towards Lebanon, a
significant sign of escalation, and a trigger for Israeli military analysts that preparations for a war footing were probably being made by Syria. This final piece of information persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to seek counsel for military options. Striking the
missile batteries in Lebanon was felt would convey the "red line" for Israel and options sought. Deputy head of the Israeli Air Force offered his opinion that a strike on the batteries was feasible "I cannot promise no losses whatsoever, but they will be minimal". A strike was
approved. On June 9th, 1982, 80+ Israeli F-15s, F-16s, F-4s, & reconnaissance UAVs (Israeli UAVs would prove decisive pieces of technology well in advance of most other nations) departed Israeli airspace. E-2C airborne early warning provided battle tracking information. The UAVs
remained airborne for the duration, providing constant locations for the Syrian SAMs. The secondary purpose of the UAVs was to convince Syria to turn on its SAM radars to locate and target the UAVs, which allowed them to pass this targeting data back to the E-2C who could pass it
on to the fighters tasked with destroying them. When the SAM batteries fired on the drones, Israeli F-15/F-16 ran air cover as the F-4s fired anti-radiation missiles at the SAM batteries. Israeli UAVs had run similar missions (without fighter cover) prior to this point and mapped
our Syria's IADS networks along Syria's border with Israel. These were engaged with long range artillery as the operation unfolded to reduce Syria's ability to strike in support of the SAMs being attacked. Additionally, Israeli jets were equipped with modern countermeasures and
electronic warfare pods, reducing the effectiveness of Soviet SAMs. When the strikes began, Syria responded by scrambling nearly 100 fighter planes and going directly after the attacking squadrons. Israeli UAVs over major Syrian airfields and along the border fed real time
updates to the E-2C on numbers, types, and headings for the incoming Syrian fighters, which was passed on to the Israeli jets. Israel had determined that any Syrian jet that left the (more robust) SAM umbrella in Syria proper was to be shot down upon crossing that invisible line.
In total, nearly 90 Syrian fighters were destroyed, at the loss of *1-3* Israeli UAVs and no lives lost. 29 of 30 SAM systems were destroyed. Strikes throughout the next 24 hours would functionally destroy a Syrian armored brigade and reduce the Syria air defense grid in Lebanon
to worse than it was before Syria moved the new SAM systems in. The news of the abysmal Soviet SAM performance directly shifted the view of clients looking to purchase Soviet systems and almost certainly influenced the design of future Russian systems to correct the flaws that
allowed Israel to operate with impunity in a missile dense environment. Anyway, this might be the most lopsided aerial victories of all time and certainly one of the most impressive SEAD missions. And that's how Israel pushed the Syrian air force's shit in.
