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As things stand, Judith Shklar’s distinction between misfortune and injustice will become a central argument in future discussions about the governmental response to the Corona crisis.
The argument is twofold: First, the distinction between misfortune and injustice is historically moveable.
While some disasters are undoubtable "natural events", they can turn from mere misfortunes to injustices when the response is inadequate or they could have been prevented in the first place.
And this discussion mostly starts with the voice of the victims.
Second, such injustices will often not be active, willfully committed, but _passive_ injustices – acts that do not conform to the expectations we can plausibly have toward governmental and other agents in a liberal democracy.
The interesting point is that especially in the US (but also here in Germany) such passive injustices can be identified on several levels. They can begin, on the lowest level, with downplaying the dangers or a slow, sloppy initial response…
…but in the end, at the highest level, the absence of an affordable health care system itself becomes a passive injustice.
As Shklar notes: When nothing is done where something could be done, we are faced with a passive injustice.
(All images from: Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, Yale UP, 1990)
(All images from: Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, Yale UP, 1990)
