With lots of discussion about how the 2020 ‘Integrated Review’ might be radically different under the influence of Dominic Cummings, here’s a thread about how a Strategic Defence & Security Review ‘normally’ works.
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The first SDSR (as opposed to Defence Review) was in 2010. The ‘S’ is significant because it brings in other Government Departments and the whole thing is overseen by the Cabinet Office not the MoD.
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SDSR10 said there should be an SDSR every 5 years. The last one was in 2015 so we were due one anyway in 2020. The SDSR should flow from the National Security Strategy which is set by the National Security Council (NSC).
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For the MoD, the review begins with instructions being issued and Options developed. These are a mix of savings (cuts), enhancements (buying new stuff) and composites (spend to save). Staff officers research how much they will save/cost and the impact of taking them.
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Hundreds of Options are generated and nothing is ruled out at this stage. Some always leak which is where the perennial ‘Red Arrows abolished/Paras merge with Marines/carrier to be sold’ stories come from.
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Leaking is usually done to prevent a savings option being taken. E.g. leak the ‘Delete [insert favourite sacred cow] Option, whip up an outrage and the SoS is forced to make a statement ruling that option out. So the theory goes.
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Sometimes it works, but it undermines trust and if savings can’t be taken this reduces the scope to invest in new capabilities.
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Leak paranoia also sets in reducing the circle within which staff officers are allowed to consult and this reduces the quality of information on which decisions are based.
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The other risk is the Minister, having taken the political flak for planning to scrap [insert favourite sacred cow] decides that they may as well collect the financial saving.
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Options are sifted and the Mad (impossible/illegal) Bad (catastrophic impact on capability) & Sad (politically unacceptable) are removed. Centre polices the process to ensure coherence and that the TLBs (RAF, Army, RN & StratCom) are ‘playing nicely’ together.
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The remaining viable options are then arranged into packages to reflect the overall direction of the NSS/SDSR and how much financial and capability risk the Govt wants to take. Packages are also assessed against industrial impact and ‘presentational issues’.
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The packages then go to the Defence Board and the NSC for a decision and the Review published. In reality, it’s not as linear as that: options are rejected, packages re-worked, and last-minute options created, but you get the idea.
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The output defines the future force 10 years hence i.e. SDSR15 defined FF25, although as SDSRs are held every 5 years, the FF remains an aiming point you never actually reach.
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We don’t know yet how the Integrated Review will turn out. The important thing is to focus on the overall strategy and avoid getting distracted by specific Options. Also, when you read stories stating x is being cut, remember the process and agenda behind the leak.
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Finally, all strategy requires assumptions to be made about the future and these will often turn out be wrong. As Prof Freedman said ‘history is made by people who don’t know what’s going to happen next’. It’s easy to criticise with hindsight.
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