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1/
Why don't the Poles get on?" demanded Simonds over the radio on 8th Aug '44, the second day of #TOTALIZE.
"Because what was asked of the Poles was bloody impossible" is #Maczek's overall conclusion.
Simonds "perhaps underestimated" the depth of the German defences...
Why don't the Poles get on?" demanded Simonds over the radio on 8th Aug '44, the second day of #TOTALIZE.
"Because what was asked of the Poles was bloody impossible" is #Maczek's overall conclusion.
Simonds "perhaps underestimated" the depth of the German defences...
2/
The Canadians and Poles faced the 12th SS Panzer Division, defending the roads to #Falaise with, according to McGilvray, approx. 60 dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns, supplemented with 90 8.8cm flak guns used in an anti-tank role.
The Polish left flank was unprotected.
The Canadians and Poles faced the 12th SS Panzer Division, defending the roads to #Falaise with, according to McGilvray, approx. 60 dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns, supplemented with 90 8.8cm flak guns used in an anti-tank role.
The Polish left flank was unprotected.
3/
Maczek had assumed Monty had anticipated this and would provide either aerial or artillery support. He did not.
The initial attack by Allied heavy bombers caused greater damage to the Poles & Canadians than to the Germans -this "considerably reduced" the artillery support.
Maczek had assumed Monty had anticipated this and would provide either aerial or artillery support. He did not.
The initial attack by Allied heavy bombers caused greater damage to the Poles & Canadians than to the Germans -this "considerably reduced" the artillery support.
/4
Maczek also touches on the inexperience of the Poles.
Maczek had used his 3 years defending Scotland's east coast to train the Poles such that they could liberate Poland from the Soviets once Germany was defeated.
<hollow laugh off-stage>
Maczek also touches on the inexperience of the Poles.
Maczek had used his 3 years defending Scotland's east coast to train the Poles such that they could liberate Poland from the Soviets once Germany was defeated.
<hollow laugh off-stage>
5/
In 1940, Maczek was the most experienced commander of armoured units in the UK, having seen recent action in Poland and France.
At the back of the queue for equipment, the Poles had become veritable tank-hoppers - training on Matildas, Valentines and Churchills...
In 1940, Maczek was the most experienced commander of armoured units in the UK, having seen recent action in Poland and France.
At the back of the queue for equipment, the Poles had become veritable tank-hoppers - training on Matildas, Valentines and Churchills...
6/
Before moving on to Covenanters and Crusaders - his armoured regiments then acquired Shermans and his reconnaissance units the "magnificent" Cromwell.
They had taken part in major training exercises - the endearingly-named SNAFFLE in '43, and KESTREL in July '44.
However.
Before moving on to Covenanters and Crusaders - his armoured regiments then acquired Shermans and his reconnaissance units the "magnificent" Cromwell.
They had taken part in major training exercises - the endearingly-named SNAFFLE in '43, and KESTREL in July '44.
However.
7/
TOTALIZE was a "blooding" for the Poles - not all had seen action and, for those that had, "techniques and tactics had undergone numerous developments" since '40. Driving past the carcasses of GOODWOOD tanks, many Poles gained their first insight into *real* armoured combat.
TOTALIZE was a "blooding" for the Poles - not all had seen action and, for those that had, "techniques and tactics had undergone numerous developments" since '40. Driving past the carcasses of GOODWOOD tanks, many Poles gained their first insight into *real* armoured combat.
8/
Add in the narrowness of the front, the difficulty of the ground, the poor intelligence, the lack of insight into conditions in Normandy (Levittoux, Maczek's chief-of-staff had been killed on liaison duties in mid-July) and Tout's concerns re lack of operational unity and ...
Add in the narrowness of the front, the difficulty of the ground, the poor intelligence, the lack of insight into conditions in Normandy (Levittoux, Maczek's chief-of-staff had been killed on liaison duties in mid-July) and Tout's concerns re lack of operational unity and ...
9/
It is hard to disagree with Maczek that the Poles & Canadians could not push through German lines because "this exceeded their capabilities."
Maczek saw value in the experience gained, despite the cost. He began to trust his own tactics - ready for Chambois and Maczuga.
It is hard to disagree with Maczek that the Poles & Canadians could not push through German lines because "this exceeded their capabilities."
Maczek saw value in the experience gained, despite the cost. He began to trust his own tactics - ready for Chambois and Maczuga.
