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YIELD AMBIGUITY
1/n
A thread in which I flesh out an analytical concept I have previously briefly intro’d.
Prompted by current kerfuffle around a supposed US need for “low yield” nuclear weapons.
#NuclearAnthropology
For example, see previous thread: https://twitter.com/nuclearanthro/status/1068322660440895489?s=21
1/n
A thread in which I flesh out an analytical concept I have previously briefly intro’d.
Prompted by current kerfuffle around a supposed US need for “low yield” nuclear weapons.
#NuclearAnthropology
For example, see previous thread: https://twitter.com/nuclearanthro/status/1068322660440895489?s=21
YIELD AMBIGUITY
2/n
Bottom Line Up Front
Includes:
-adversary capability to accurately characterize & transmit info about yield of nuclear detonation
-adversary ability to ID yield as intentional (not fizzle)
-adversary beliefs & values re: “low yield”
#NuclearAnthropology
2/n
Bottom Line Up Front
Includes:
-adversary capability to accurately characterize & transmit info about yield of nuclear detonation
-adversary ability to ID yield as intentional (not fizzle)
-adversary beliefs & values re: “low yield”
#NuclearAnthropology
YIELD AMBIGUITY
3/n
Notice that, as described above, yield ambiguity is conceptually & analytically different from (and therefore worthy of separate analysis) related concepts including:
-ISR/BDA
-warhead ambiguity (W76-1 or W76-2 on that SLBM?)
-target ambiguity
3/n
Notice that, as described above, yield ambiguity is conceptually & analytically different from (and therefore worthy of separate analysis) related concepts including:
-ISR/BDA
-warhead ambiguity (W76-1 or W76-2 on that SLBM?)
-target ambiguity
YIELD AMBIGUITY
4/n
For attacks w/ “low yield” nuclear weapons to signal (& thus be less escalatory) an adversary must:
-be able to accurately characterize yield of detonation(s)
-accurately transmit info to relevant folk
-treat yield as an intentional, communicative act
4/n
For attacks w/ “low yield” nuclear weapons to signal (& thus be less escalatory) an adversary must:
-be able to accurately characterize yield of detonation(s)
-accurately transmit info to relevant folk
-treat yield as an intentional, communicative act
YIELD AMBIGUITY
5/n
ability of an adversary to accurately characterize yield of a nuclear detonation—& accurately transmit info to relevant folk— in midst of a nuclear war is not guaranteed (at best).
See, for example, complexity of Vela Incident:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/14.pdf
5/n
ability of an adversary to accurately characterize yield of a nuclear detonation—& accurately transmit info to relevant folk— in midst of a nuclear war is not guaranteed (at best).
See, for example, complexity of Vela Incident:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/14.pdf
YIELD AMBIGUITY
6/n
An adversary must recognize yield of a nuclear detonation in an attack as an intentional signal & give a flying fuck that it is.
For example, lower yield detonation(s) may be explained as fizziles or technical malfunctions (esp in an era of non-testing).
6/n
An adversary must recognize yield of a nuclear detonation in an attack as an intentional signal & give a flying fuck that it is.
For example, lower yield detonation(s) may be explained as fizziles or technical malfunctions (esp in an era of non-testing).
YIELD AMBIGUITY
7/n
Any discussion of (de/non/less)escalatory effects of nuclear weapon MUST consider adversary beliefs & values about nuclear weapons & yield.
adversary decision makers’ beliefs are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to be homogenous.
#NuclearSemiotics
#NuclearAnthropology
7/n
Any discussion of (de/non/less)escalatory effects of nuclear weapon MUST consider adversary beliefs & values about nuclear weapons & yield.
adversary decision makers’ beliefs are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to be homogenous.
#NuclearSemiotics
#NuclearAnthropology
YIELD AMBIGUITY
8/n
adversary beliefs & values about nuclear weapons & relevance of yield may not be accessible to analysts prior to conflict.
those beliefs & values will interact with unpredictable contextual, technological, & social dynamics in complex ways.
8/n
adversary beliefs & values about nuclear weapons & relevance of yield may not be accessible to analysts prior to conflict.
those beliefs & values will interact with unpredictable contextual, technological, & social dynamics in complex ways.
YIELD AMBIGUITY
9/9
In sum: yield ambiguity is an under discussed and under theorized concept linked to, but analytically distinct from, other issues like warhead ambiguity.
So cite me if you use it and I’m gonna try to expand on this into a paper.
#PhDLife
9/9
In sum: yield ambiguity is an under discussed and under theorized concept linked to, but analytically distinct from, other issues like warhead ambiguity.
So cite me if you use it and I’m gonna try to expand on this into a paper.
#PhDLife
A) As always, if you enjoy, learn from, find useful my comments please consider enabling my work:
http://patreon.com/nuclearanthro
http://paypal.me/nuclearanthro
B) Allow me to summarize some of my arguments about the W76-2 lower yield nuclear weapon in meme form:
#PhDLife
http://patreon.com/nuclearanthro
http://paypal.me/nuclearanthro
B) Allow me to summarize some of my arguments about the W76-2 lower yield nuclear weapon in meme form:
#PhDLife
